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A Homeless Bill of Rights (Revolution)
Sara K. Rankin*
This Article examines an emerging movement so far unexplored by legal
scholarship: the proposal and, in some states, the enactment of a Homeless Bill
of Rights. This Article presents these new laws as a lens to re-examine storied
debates over positive and social welfare rights. Homeless bills of rights also
present a compelling opportunity to re-examine rights-based theories in the
context of social movement scholarship. Specifically, could these laws be
understood as part of a new “rights revolution”? What conditions might
influence the impact of these new laws on the individual rights of the homeless
or the housed? On American rights culture and consciousness?
The Article surveys current efforts to advance homeless bills of rights across
nine states and the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico and evaluates these case studies
from a social movement perspective. Ultimately, the Article predicts that these
new laws are more likely to have an incremental social and normative impact
than an immediate legal impact. Even so, homeless bills of rights are a critical,
if slight, step to advance the rights of one of the most vulnerable segments of
contemporary society. Perhaps as significantly, these new laws present an
opportunity for housed Americans to confront our collective, deeply-rooted biases
against the homeless.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Moral rights are an important source of legal rights, but it is also true that
legal rights influence the content of moral rights.1

A new movement is afoot: in June 2012, Rhode Island passed the
mainland’s first Homeless Bill of Rights. State legislatures in
California, Hawaii, Illinois, Connecticut, Oregon, Vermont, Missouri,
and Massachusetts quickly followed suit, introducing their own bills.
So far, Connecticut and Illinois have already joined Rhode Island with
freshly enacted homeless bills of rights. Other states are actively
evaluating the prospects for such legislation.2
Homeless bills of rights articulate a vibrant range of rights and
remedies. For example, some provide the right to shelter, sustenance,
or health care, while others incorporate rights against employment
discrimination or police harassment. Some provide civil remedies for
those whose statutory rights have been violated; at least one vests the
creation, implementation, and enforcement of rights in an
administrative entity. Although these new laws illustrate varying
substantive provisions and strategic compromises, they share the
1
2

Philip Harvey, Aspirational Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 701, 715 (2004).
See infra Part III.
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overarching goal of improving the lives of homeless Americans.
The emergence of this new legislative tool raises compelling
questions. What exactly is a homeless bill of rights? What is its
purpose? What are the differences and similarities across jurisdictions?
What types of rights are or should be covered? How, if at all, are these
rights different than those afforded to housed individuals? Do these
laws announce any new rights? Or are they merely statutory
reiterations of constitutional or civil rights already afforded to the
homeless—or for that matter, to housed individuals? If homeless bills
of rights are only statutory reiterations of already existing rights, how
might these laws meaningfully improve the lives of homeless people?
On the other hand, if homeless bills of rights actually purport to
create new rights for homeless people—such as positive social welfare
rights—should advocates fight for judicial enforcement provisions? If
a right is not judicially enforceable, is it really a right at all? Many legal
scholars and homeless advocates contend that judicial enforceability is
the sine qua non of a right.3 Indeed, virtually all homeless bills of rights
advanced on the mainland United States explicitly provide for civil
remedies.4 But others dispute the necessity of judicial enforceability to
the realization of a right,5 instead emphasizing the realization of rights
through agency implementation.6 After all, judicial rulings do not
necessarily translate to agency implementation; to the contrary,
judicial enforcement may be ineffectual7 or even provoke legislative
repeal of a law.8 Accordingly, should homeless advocates expend
significant resources to ensure homeless bills of rights contain civil
remedies provisions? What approach best ensures the implementation
and realization of rights for homeless Americans?
By their very nature, homeless bills of rights invite such robust
rights-based inquiries. Ultimately, the value of a homeless bill of rights
must be measured by its potential contribution to the lives of homeless
Americans. Of course, any ideal outcome would significantly revise
how American society perceives, values, and incorporates homeless
people—the law would be part of a social movement that transforms
3

See infra notes 232, 233, and accompanying text.
See Table 1, Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of Provisions. Massachusetts is an
outlier, explicitly stating that the law does not create a new private right of action that
would not already otherwise exist. See H. 3595, 188th Reg. Sess. § 31(d) (Mass. 2013).
5
See infra Part Part III.C. Indeed, many scholars question whether rights really
exist at all. See generally, Michael McCann, The Unbearable Lightness of Rights: On Sociolegal
Inquiry in the Global Era, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 245 (2013).
6
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
7
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
8
See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
4
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relationships between the housed and homeless from exclusive to
inclusive. In this respect, homeless bills of rights might be understood
as part of an effort to naturalize a normative vision. Social movement
theory can help to explain how such a normative vision might become
a reality.
This Article is the first to identify and analyze the new, growing
phenomenon of homeless bills of rights in the United States. The
Article is enriched with feedback and insights of homeless advocates
nationwide, the result of dozens of interviews with advocates inside and
outside of active jurisdictions. Part I introduces the specific context of
homeless advocacy, spotlighting key issues with homelessness in the
United States. Part II surveys case studies of current efforts to enact
homeless bills of rights in nine states and Puerto Rico. This section
briefly describes the history, content, and status of these bills, and
draws substantive and strategic comparisons among these case studies.
Part III introduces a rights revolution framework. Specifically, this
section surveys rights-based theories and their application to social
movement “rights revolutions.”
It applies a rights revolution
framework to these case studies and analyzes the potential challenges
and benefits of this new legislative tool, both from a practical and
theoretical perspective. The Article concludes that homeless bills of
rights are more likely to have an incremental social and normative
impact than an immediate legal impact. Even so, these new laws are
an important step toward a long-overdue rights revolution for one of
America’s most vulnerable populations. Perhaps as significantly, these
new laws present an opportunity for housed Americans to confront our
persistent, deeply-rooted biases against the homeless.9

9

The use of “the homeless,” an adjective, to refer to non-housed human beings,
can be fairly criticized as dehumanizing. Some advocates, however, (such as the
National Coalition for the Homeless) commonly use the phrase interchangeably as a
noun and as an adjective. In this Article, I’ve tried to err on the side of using the
phrase as an adjective unless such use impacts readability. I’ve also attempted to make
analogous use of the phrase “housed” to refer to people with stable housing
conditions.
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II. SNAPSHOT OF HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to
me. I lift my lamp beside the golden door!10

Despite the Statue of Liberty’s welcoming message, the homeless
remain one of the most vulnerable, reviled, and underserved
populations in America. Estimating the number of homeless people
in the United States is an elusive task11 and, in the endeavor, it is easy
to forget that numbers represent real human beings. There are no
definitive estimates of U.S. homelessness, but some commonly cited
numbers suggest that anywhere from 650,000 to 3.5 million Americans
are homeless at any given time.12 Nearly 40 percent of these people are
families with children.13

10

The Statue of Liberty bears these first two lines of this sonnet from Emma
Lazarus, “The New Colossus.”
Statue of Liberty National Monument,
LIBERTYSTATEPARK.COM, http://www.libertystatepark.com/emma.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2015).
11
The slipperiness of the effort partly reflects the various ways and purposes the
homeless may be defined or categorized into subcategories or subpopulations. The
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) considers an individual
homeless if he or she lives in an emergency shelter, transitional housing program, safe
haven, or a place not meant for human habitation, such as a car, abandoned buildings,
or on the street. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2013 Annual
Homeless Assessment Report to Congress, at 2 (2013) [hereinafter HUD 2013 Report to
Congress]. But HUD also categorizes homelessness in various ways. See, e.g., id. at 2
(distinguishing definitions of “Chronically Homeless” and “Sheltered Homeless”).
Moreover, the data can also be complicated by the use of varying baselines and
measurements of time: estimates might focus on a single evening, a particular week,
year, or other increment. See, e.g., infra note 12.
12
Estimates vary depending on the methodology used. The lower estimate comes
from the latest U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development single-nightcount, which is an annual “point-in-time” estimate of persons homeless on a single
night. HUD 2013 Report to Congress, supra note 11, at 22. These point-in-time
estimates are highly controversial and criticized for undercounting homelessness. See,
e.g., National Coalition for the Homeless, How Many People Experience Homelessness?,
NATIONALHOMELESS.ORG (July 2009), http://nationalhomeless.org/. The higher
estimate of 3.5 million is an annual estimation of Americans that experience
homelessness over the course of a single year. See National Alliance to End
Homelessness, A Snapshot of Homelessness, ENDHOMELESSNESS.ORG, http://www.end
homelessness.org/pages/snapshot (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). Homelessness is a
difficult number to measure definitively; the rising number of “unsheltered homeless”
shows that more people—especially families—are sleeping in shelters, living in their
cars, and taking up residence in tent communities. HUD 2013 Report to Congress,
supra note 11, at 20 (stating that unsheltered homeless individuals increased in major
cities in 2012).
13
Id. at 3–4.
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In fact, homeless families represent one of the fastest growing
segments of the homeless population.14
Children comprise
approximately 23 percent of the homeless population.15 The majority
of homeless children are under the age of seven.16 According to a 2011
study by the National Center of Family Homelessness, approximately
one out of every forty-five children in the United States experiences
homelessness at some point in the year.17 The number of homeless
school children has grown dramatically; in 2011–2012, 40 states
reported increases in their homeless student populations, and ten
states reported increases of 20 percent or more.18 Last year, the
number of homeless students enrolled in U.S. preschools and K-12
schools reached a record high of at least 1,168,354 children.19
Although one measure suggests a national decline in
homelessness of nearly 4 percent from 2012 to 2013,20 several states
experienced a substantial increase in homelessness for the same time
period.21 According to the latest U.S. Conference of Mayors report, 60
percent of surveyed cities reported a 7 percent average increase in

14

The percentage of homeless families increased by 1.4 percent (or 3,222 people)
from 2011 to 2012. HUD 2013 Report to Congress, supra note 11, at 3.
15
The United States Conference of Mayors, A Status Report on Hunger and
Homelessness in America’s Cities: A 23-City Survey, at 13 (2007).
16
The Characteristics and Needs of Families Experiencing Homelessness, at 5, NATIONAL
CENTER ON FAMILY HOMELESSNESS (2011), http://www.familyhomelessness.org/
media/306.pdf.
17
National Center on Family Homelessness, Children, AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR
RESEARCH (2010), http://www.familyhomelessness.org/children.php?p=ts.
18
Brent Staples, Homeless Kids in Rough Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013
(reporting data from the National Center for Homeless Education).
19
U.S. Hits Record Number of Homeless Students, FIRSTFOCUS.ORG (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://firstfocus.org/news/press-release/u-s-hits-record-number-homeless-students/
(citing data from the U.S. Department of Education). First Focus reports this is the
“highest number on record, and a 10 percent increase over the previous school year.
The number of homeless children in public schools has increased 72 percent since the
beginning of the recession.” Id. Significantly, the estimate of homeless students is an
underestimation of the number of homeless children in the United States. Id. (“[The]
data [does] not include homeless infants and toddlers, young children who are not
enrolled in public preschool programs, and homeless children and youth who were
not identified by school officials.”).
20
This estimate comes from the HUD single-night count data, which are soundly
criticized as underestimations of homelessness. See HUD 2013 Report to Congress,
supra note 11, at 1, 6; see also How Many People Experience Homelessness?, NATIONAL
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (July 2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/
factsheets/How_Many.html.
21
The U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2012 Status Report on Hunger & Homelessness, at
2, available at http://usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/2012/1219-report-HH.pdf
[hereinafter 2012 Conference of Mayors Report]; see also HUD 2013 Report to
Congress, supra note 11, at 8.
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homelessness overall.22 The number of homeless families increased in
71 percent of cities by an average increase of 8 percent.23 And
approximately 60 percent of cities expect the number of homeless
families to continue to increase over the next year.24
The causes of homelessness are commonly misunderstood. A
popular instinct is to blame homeless people for their condition,25 but
research consistently indicates that the leading cause of homelessness
is lack of affordable housing.26 In fact, approximately 17 percent of
homeless adults are employed, but still unable to afford housing.27 For
families with children, the most common causes of homelessness also
include poverty, unemployment, eviction, and domestic violence.28
Emergency shelter does not compensate for the lack of affordable
housing. Due to lack of sufficient shelter, approximately 64 percent of
cities turn away homeless families with children; shelters in 60 percent
of cities turn away unaccompanied individuals.29 This sustained
increase in the unsheltered homeless warrants particular concern,
because this subpopulation is the most vulnerable to death, illness,
violence, and a litany of other maladies compared to sheltered
individuals.30
This subpopulation is also most affected by
criminalization measures and ordinances, which penalize them for
living on the streets and in public places.31 But, as explained below,
22

2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2.
Id.
24
Id. at 3.
25
See generally JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1993) (analyzing and debunking persistent “myths” that homeless people are
“somehow responsible for their own poverty”); see also discussion infra Part II.A.
26
2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2. Popular sentiment
suggests that the housed perceive the causes of homelessness to be attributable to
those who experience it; in other words, a persistent myth is that homelessness is
caused by homeless people themselves. See discussion infra Part II.A.
27
2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2. See also Mireya Navarro,
In New York, Having a Job, or 2, Doesn’t Mean Having a Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013,
at A1 (citing a study that “‘contrary to popular belief,’ 79 percent of homeless heads
of family had recent work histories . . . .”).
28
2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2. Approximately 16
percent of single homeless adults are victims of domestic violence. I
d.
29
Id. at 3.
30
See, e.g., The Hard, Cold Facts About the Deaths of Homeless People, NATIONAL HEALTH
CARE FOR THE HOMELESS COUNCIL (May 29, 2006), available at
http://www.nhchc.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/HardColdFacts.pdf.
31
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, Report: Criminalizing Crisis:
The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, at 6 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.nlchp.org/Criminalizing_Crisis [hereinafter 2011 NLCHP Report]. See
generally National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, No Safe Place: The
23
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both temporarily sheltered and unsheltered people shoulder these
special burdens.
A. Hated & Homeless
People are afraid to get out of their cars when they see a homeless person . . .
They haven’t been a problem. They just scare people.32

Perhaps the greatest barrier to homeless rights is the prevalence
of societal animus toward homeless people. Princeton University
psychology professor, Susan Fiske, has spent years documenting
persistent and deeply-held prejudice against poor and homeless
people.33 Professor Fiske’s research shows that housed people
frequently perceive homeless Americans as things, not as human
beings.34 Moreover, her research suggests that housed individuals react
to poverty and homelessness with revulsion instead of sympathy.35
Documented prejudice against the homeless is often associated with
efforts to justify the prejudice: assumptions that homelessness is
entirely self-induced helps to validate societal disdain.36 But this
Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities (July 2014), http://nlchp.org/
documents/No_Safe_Place [hereinafter 2014 NLCHP Report].
32
A business owner in Richland, South Carolina quoted in Alan Blinder, South
Carolina City Takes Steps to Evict Homeless from Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, at
A15.
33
See, e.g., Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low:
Neuroimaging Responses to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10, 848 (2006)
(describing study results placing homeless people in the “lowest” category, which
“elicits the worst kind of prejudice—disgust and contempt—based on moral violations
and subsequent negative outcomes that these groups allegedly caused themselves”);
ALEXANDER TODOROV, SUSAN FISKE, & DEBORAH PRENTICE, SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE:
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND 3 (2011) (describing
how study participants “dehumanized [homeless people] as ill-intentioned, inept,
unfamiliar, dissimilar, strange, and not uniquely human or quite typically human”);
Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Social Groups That Elicit Disgust Are Differentially
Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 45, 45–51 (2007)
(finding study participants dehumanize homeless people as stimuli that elicit
“disgust”).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Joel Blau discusses this tendency and explains his efforts
to distinguish carefully between a reasonable interest in the population’s
characteristics and the rather obsessive preoccupation with those
individual traits—drugs, alcoholism, or mental illness—which some use
to explain their current status. Once we acknowledge that these
personal characteristics are not sufficient explanations of homelessness,
we can begin to explore the real causes.
BLAU, supra note 25. See also Timothy Egan, Govern in Poetry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013)
(discussing societal tendency to blame the poor and concluding “that making the poor
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impulse flies in the face of extensive research on contributors to
homelessness, which suggests a more complex picture.37 This
disconnect is particularly acute with respect to the fastest growing
segment of the homeless population—families with children—whose
circumstances are not as easily attributed to “their fault.”38
But scientific and economic research is not necessary to prove
societal animus toward the homeless; popular culture abounds with
examples of glorified violence against the homeless and anti-homeless
sentiment.39 For example, a recent issue of Maxim magazine suggested
to its readers: “Kill one for fun. We’re 87 percent sure it’s legal.”40
Similarly, popular fight videos and viral hits, such as “Bumfights,”
feature “fights between homeless men plied by the producers with
alcohol, as well as sadistic assaults, where terrified sleeping homeless
people are startled awake and bound with duct tape.”41 The
dehumanization of homeless people can take other forms of
entertainment. In Seattle, a “self-proclaimed entrepreneur” offers
$2,000 “Homelessness Tours,” where voyeurs can get a thrill by
“checking out . . . homeless haunts” and “try[ing their] hand at
panhandling or sleeping on a park bench.”42
out to be lazy, or dependent, or stupid, does not make them less poor[,] [i]t only
makes the person saying such a thing feel superior.”).
37
See, e.g., 2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2 (highlighting
variables such as lack of affordable housing, poverty, and unemployment as key
factors); BLAU, supra note 25, at 33–59 (discussing various studies of economic causes
of homelessness); BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, MAKING ROOM: THE ECONOMICS OF
HOMELESSNESS 4–6 (1996) (analyzing various causes of homelessness and remarking
that “[a]lcoholism is no more an explanation of homelessness than meteorite failure
is an explanation of war”); Maria Julia & Helen P. Harnett, Exploring Cultural Issues in
Puerto Rican Homelessness, 33 CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH 4, 318–30 (1999) (concluding,
in part, that socio-cultural variables “such as familialism and intergenerational
dependency” are unique and critical influences in Puerto Rican homelessness).
38
2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21, at 2 (listing primary causes
of homelessness for families as lack of affordable housing, poverty, unemployment,
eviction, and domestic violence).
39
Crimes Against America’s Homeless: Is the Violence Growing?, S. 111–915, 111th Cong.
at 57 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg64876/
pdf/CHRG-111shrg64876.pdf (statement of Professor Brian H. Levin, California State
University); see also id. at 171–229 (statement of the National Coalition for the
Homeless).
40
Id. at 60 (statement of Professor Brian H. Levin, California State University).
41
Id.
42
See Mark Byrnes, People in Seattle Are Outraged By This $2,000 “Homeless Tour”,
CITYLAB.COM (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/arts-and-lifestyle/
2013/10/people-seattle-are-outraged-2000-homelessness-tour/7138. The sponsor of
the tour maintains that his goal is to increase understanding of homelessness, but the
playful tone of the tour itinerary and the excessive private fee has provoked criticism.
Id.
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Of course, dehumanizing homeless people is not limited to
mainstream society: homeless people are frequently the targets of
“thrill-kills” or other forms of unprovoked violence. Indeed, the
commission of bias-motivated violence is sufficiently common that the
National Coalition for the Homeless publishes annual reports
detailing the murder, torture, and assault of homeless people across
the United States.43
Even some elected officials appear to think open hostility toward
the homeless is generally acceptable; recently, five-term Hawaii State
Representative, Tom Brower, publicized his one-man effort to “clean
up” public areas by destroying the possessions of homeless Hawaiian
residents with a sledgehammer.44 Representative Brower told the
media, “If someone is sleeping at night on the bus stop, I don’t do
anything, but if they are sleeping during the day, I’ll walk up and say,
‘Get your ass moving.’”45 Representative Brower’s campaign may seem
unusual, but to the contrary: as explained below, efforts to rid society
of the homeless are increasingly codified by law.
B. The Criminalization of Homelessness
[P]erhaps the single most significant attribute of homelessness is its visibility.
Visible poverty disrupts the ordinary rhythms of public life.46

Any effort to stem homelessness must confront the growing
phenomenon of state statutes and city ordinances that criminalize
homelessness. Despite the fact that most cities lack adequate shelter
space to allow homeless individuals the ability to conduct “lifesustaining” activities out of the public eye, 73 percent of American
cities have ordinances prohibiting such activities as sleeping or
camping, eating, sitting, begging or panhandling, and urinating or
defecating in public.47 At their core, these laws—often called “quality
of life” laws—criminalize homeless people for visibly living in public.
Joel Blau explains:
43

See, e.g., Hate Crimes against the Homeless: Violence Hidden in Plain View, NATIONAL
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.national
homeless.org/publications/hatecrimes/hatecrimes2010.pdf.
44
See Jim Mendoza, Lawmaker Hammers Home His Homelessness Solution, HAWAII
NEWS NOW (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/24003737/
lawmaker-hammers-home-his-homeless-solution.
45
See Scott Keyes, State Rep Uses Sledgehammer to Destroy Homeless People’s Possessions,
THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 19, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/11/
19/2966371/hawaii-homeless-smash/.
46
BLAU, supra note 25, at 4.
47
2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31, at 6–7.
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[P]ublic displays of poverty are somehow improper. Since
only the most desperate people exhibit their poverty, the
slightest glimpse of their desperation makes others feel
uneasy. Witnesses to homelessness then become like the
unwilling spectators of an intimate domestic quarrel. They
know these things occur, but firmly believe they should be
kept private if at all possible.48
Thus, criminalization laws are not an effort to address homelessness;
instead, these laws seek to improve the quality of life of the housed by
reducing the visibility of the homeless through incarceration or
dislocation.49
Such city ordinances criminalizing homelessness continue to
increase. Of 234 cities surveyed by the National Law Center on
Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP), 53 percent prohibited begging
or panhandling in public places, 40 percent prohibited camping in
public places, and 33 percent prohibited sitting or lying down in public
places.50 These laws authorize police to perform “sweeps” to clear
public areas of homeless people.51 Police sweeps often result in the
confiscation and destruction of personal belongings, including
identification, documentation, medications, and other property of
sentimental value.52
Criminalization measures can also perpetuate homelessness by
creating barriers to access.53 First, the loss of important documentation
during police sweeps impedes the affected person’s ability to provide
necessary identification for employment, housing, social services, and
benefits.54 Second, if a homeless person violates a “quality of life”
ordinance, she can face criminal penalties such as arrest, jail time, and
fines.55 Many employers and Public Housing Authorities perform
criminal background checks to determine baseline eligibility.56 In
addition, some states terminate or suspend certain social services and
benefits when a person has been incarcerated.57 As a result, homeless
individuals who have been penalized for violating these ordinances
48

BLAU, supra note 25, at 4.
See, e.g., Professor Robert Adleman, University of Buffalo, quoted in Blinder,
supra note 32, at A15 (“[T]hese ordinances and policies just redistribute homeless
persons. They don’t solve the problem of homelessness.”).
50
2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31, at 7–8.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 28.
54
Id. at 21.
55
Id. at 15, 35.
56
31 2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31, at 32–34.
57
Id.
49
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find themselves unable to obtain gainful employment, permanent
housing, or services and benefits.
Criminalization laws do not merely target homeless people; these
laws also target people and organizations that might try to feed them.
Homeless people are among those who struggle daily with hunger and
inadequate access to food.58 Nevertheless, cities also increasingly target
individual citizens and groups who attempt to share food with the
hungry.59 These municipalities use a variety of legal prohibitions and
restrictive policies to stop or discourage the sharing of food with the
homeless.60 Violators of these anti-food sharing laws can face
Los Angeles,
significant criminal and financial penalties.61
Philadelphia, Seattle, and Orlando are just a few of more than thirty
cities that have either adopted or debated legislation to ban the
feeding of homeless people in public places.62

58

Approximately 82 percent of surveyed cities reported that emergency food
assistance increased in 2011 by an average of 22 percent. 2012 Conference of Mayors
Report, supra note 21, at 1. According to surveyed cities, approximately 19 percent of
people needing emergency food assistance do not receive it. Id. In 95 percent of
surveyed cities, emergency food distributors had to reduce the quantity of food
allocated to needy people because of a lack of resources. Id. In 89 percent of cities,
these facilities had to turn hungry people away. Id.
59
See generally National Coalition for the Homeless and the National Law Center
on Homelessness & Poverty, A Place at the Table: Prohibitions on Sharing Food with People
Experiencing Homelessness, NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (Dec. 2010),
available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/foodsharing/Food_
Sharing_2010.pdf. See generally National Coalition for the Homeless and the National
Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, Feeding Intolerance: Prohibitions on Sharing Food
with People Experiencing Homelessness, NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (Nov.
2007), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/foodsharing/
Food_Sharing.pdf.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 3. These laws are particularly punitive in light of recent cuts to the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), which provides food assistance
to approximately 47 million people. Additional cuts may be on the horizon, as
Congress considers a Farm Bill that would further cut SNAP food assistance. See Brad
Plumer, Food Stamps Will Get Cut By $5 billion This Week — And More Cuts Could Follow,
WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/10/28/food-stamps-will-get-cut-by-5-billion-this-week-and-more-cuts-couldfollow/. The cuts are expected to put more pressure on the hungry and to increase
demand at food banks.
62
Lawrence Downes, Insert Homeless Headline Here, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2013)
(surveying city efforts to ban feeding programs and observing that “[o]nce you move
the homeless out of sight, they are almost out of mind.”); Adam Nagourney, As
Homeless Line Up for Food, Los Angeles Weighs Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013, at A1
(reporting on the L.A. ordinance and observing the city’s homeless “situation. . . has
stirred no small amount of frustration and embarrassment among civic leaders, now
amplified by fears of the hungry and mostly homeless people, who have come to count
on these meals.”).
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Advocates nationwide argue that these increasingly popular laws
violate homeless Americans’ constitutional rights and basic human
dignity.63 The discriminatory and pernicious impact of these “quality
of life” laws makes them a top priority for many advocates.64
C. The Costs of Homelessness
Anytime there’s a dollar tag, there will be a problem.65

Homeless bills of rights are critical tests, not only of societal
attitudes toward the homeless, but also of societal and legislative
attitudes toward positive rights. Economic and social rights are
sometimes referred to as “positive rights” because they create new
government obligations or actions.66 Civil and political rights, on the
other hand, are often referred to as “negative rights” because they
recognize a right to be left alone; negative rights are protections from
state interference or intrusion.67 Positive rights are commonly
perceived to be more expensive than negative rights; however, this
proposition is hotly debated.68 Moreover, some research suggests that
positive social welfare rights remedies are less costly and more effective
than other alternatives.69 Nonetheless, in American politics, positive

63

See, e.g., 2014 NLCHP Report, supra note 31. For example, the American Civil
Liberties Union recently filed suit on behalf of a homeless couple in Miner, Missouri,
a city in one of the states considering a homeless bill of rights. See Kevin Murphy, A
Homeless Couple Sues a Missouri Town for Asking Them to Leave, REUTERS, Dec. 16, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/us-usa-homeless-missouriidUSBRE9BG03820131217.
64
Each of the advocates interviewed identified criminalization of homelessness,
frequently along with a right to housing, as a top priority. See, e.g., Telephone interview
with Jim Ryczek, Executive Director, Rhode Island Coalition for the Homeless (Feb.
27, 2013); Telephone interview with Paul Boden, Organizing Director of Western
Regional Advocacy Project (Feb. 22, 2013); Telephone interview with Alison Eisinger,
Executive Director, Seattle King County Coalition on Homelessness (Feb. 28, 2013);
Telephone interview with Karina O’Malley, Founder of Crossroads Justice Center &
Shelter, Green Bay, Wisconsin (Feb. 28, 2013); Telephone interview with Lynn Lewis,
Executive Director, Picture the Homeless, New York City (Mar. 4, 2013).
65
Telephone interview with Adam Arms, Legal Coordinator, Western Regional
Advocacy Project (WRAP) (Feb. 25, 2012).
66
Frank Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 863–64 (2001).
67
Id. Observe also that many scholars critique the distinction between positive
and negative rights as misleading. See, e.g., id. at 875–77; Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare
Rights & the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1909 (2004).
68
See generally, STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (W.W. Norton & Co. 1999) (explaining that all legal
rights—both positive and negative—must be enforced by the government and
therefore no right is costless).
69
See, e.g., infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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rights discourse commonly centers on money.70
For example, many advocates point to evidence that a primary
cause of homelessness is a lack of affordable housing;71 therefore, any
serious legislative effort to advance homeless rights must address
affordable housing.72 Opponents respond that affordable housing
remedies are, well, unaffordable.73 Whether advocates prioritize
affordable housing, health care, job training, education, or other
positive remedies to stem homelessness, the apparent magnitude of
the problem invites rejection. It is not economically or logistically
feasible, opponents maintain, to solve homelessness.

70

Frank Cross channels this sort of “pragmatic, consequentialist” evaluation of
positive rights. Cross, supra note 66, at 878. He proposes various problems with
positive rights, including what he calls “the economics of rights enforcement,” “the
politics of rights enforcement,” and “the practical effect” of rights enforcement. Id. at
862. As a result, Cross observes that positive social welfare rights “are rare and quite
limited”; generally, these rights are most clearly recognized when they “conform to
majoritarian sentiment” and do not “impose substantial costs” on government
budgets. Id. at 873. Although Cross focuses on constitutional positive rights, his
critique has similar implications for positive statutory rights—such as a right to
housing— that might be articulated in a homeless bill of rights.
71
Interviewed advocates expressed consensus on the lack of affordable housing as
a primary cause of homelessness and as a priority issue. See, e.g., Interview with Karina
O’Malley, supra note 64; Interview with Eisinger, supra note 64; Interview with Ryczek,
supra note 64; Interview with Boden, supra note 64. Advocates’ perspectives are
confirmed by other studies, including the latest U.S. Conference of Mayor’s report.
2012 Conference of Mayors Report, supra note 21.
72
Housing is considered affordable when its cost constitutes 30 percent or less of
a household’s monthly income. The State of Homelessness in America 2012, at 24,
NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS (Jan. 17, 2012), http://
www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/the-state-of-homelessness-in-america-2012.
In 2010, however, approximately one in four U.S. renter households spent 50 percent
or more of their monthly income on housing. Id. In 2010, some states saw a severely
high housing cost burden of over 80 percent of monthly household income. Id. Even
in states with relatively low levels of housing cost burden, more than half of households
below the poverty line still spent more than 50 percent of their income on housing.
Id.
73
See, e.g., Mai Thi Nguyena, Victoria Basolob & Abhishek Tiwarib, Opposition to
Affordable Housing in the U.S.A.: Debate Framing and the Responses of Local Actors, 30
HOUSING, THEORY, & SOC’Y 2, 107–30 (2012) (discussing opponents’ many motivations
and arguments, including costs); Editorial, Extreme Budget Cuts of 2014, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/opinion/sunday/extremebudget-cuts-of-2014.html?_r=0 (highlighting pending legislation to cut HUD
affordable housing programs in light of economic pressures); Annie Lowrey, As
Automatic Budget Cuts Go Into Effect, Poor May Be Hit Particularly Hard, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/us/politics/poor-face-most-pain-asautomatic-budget-cuts-take-effect.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the impact of
sequestration cuts on housing programs).
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Instead, the impulse for legislative bodies is often to pursue what
are perceived as cheaper, quicker fixes to “solve” homelessness.
Frequently, these fixes amount to “out of sight and out of mind”
strategies that remove the homeless from sight— such as
criminalization laws or relocation initiatives.74 For example, some
cities—such as Honolulu, New York City, Baton Rouge, and San
Francisco—have attempted to weed out homeless residents by offering
them free, one-way transportation out of state.75 Supporters maintain
that these programs are an effort to return homeless residents to
friends or relatives in other states; critics argue that such programs
misdirect public funds in a transparent effort to “pass[] the problem
of homelessness to another city,” instead of investing in solutions to
homelessness.76

74

These criminalization or “quality of life” laws demonstrate the Broken Windows
theory of community development: the first signs of poverty in a community are like
the first broken windows; they must be repaired or removed immediately to prevent
spreading deterioration. See, e.g., Historical Criminalization Fact Sheet Homeless Bill of
Rights Campaign, at 2, WESTERN REGIONAL ADVOCACY PROJECT, available at
http://wraphome.org/images/stories/ab5documents/HistoricalCriminalizationFact
Sheet.pdf. Adherents to this theory may view homeless people as “broken windows”
that should be removed for the good of the community. Id. Joel Blau explains some
of the psychological motivations behind Broken Windows laws:
If one encounter with a homeless person is awkward, the cumulative
effect of many such encounters is discordant. Some people are generous
and do not mind occasional requests for money. Too many requests,
though, soon exhaust their generosity. Losing their capacity to engage
in single charitable acts, they are increasingly inclined to see
homelessness as a disfigurement of the landscape, and begging as a
personal assault. After a while, public opinion sours, and demands
intensify to get the homeless off the street.
BLAU, supra note 26, at 4. Such Broken Windows laws overtax the criminal justice
system and cost taxpayers substantially more than providing housing for the homeless.
See 2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31, at 37–40. Advocates also contend these laws
contradict traditional standards of fairness embodied in the Bill of Rights, especially
the right to due process, the right to free speech, and the right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. Id. at 19.
75
See, e.g., Olivia B. Waxman, Hawaii Offers Homeless One-Way Tickets Out of State,
TIME.COM (July 31, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/07/31/hawaii-offershomeless-one-way-tickets-out-of-state/. In a similar vein, states such as Nevada,have
been sued by other municipalities for allegedly bussing homeless people out of state.
See Rick Lyman, Once Suicidal and Shipped Off, Now Battling Nevada Over Care, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2013, at A17 (describing class action lawsuit brought by San Francisco against
state of Nevada and suggesting similar incidents in other cities).
76
Waxman, supra note 75 (quoting Arnold S. Cohen, CEO of Partnership for the
Homeless).
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These common legislative responses avoid engagement with the
thorny questions about whether or how positive rights could be
afforded to the homeless.77 Efforts to hide the visibility of homelessness
not only fail to address the underlying problems of homelessness, but
research suggests that such efforts are costly and ineffective in the longrun. Several studies show that incarceration of the homeless costs
more than the provision of shelter or permanent housing.78 Some
projections estimate that on average, a city spends approximately $87
per day to incarcerate a person, compared to $28 per day to provide
shelter for that person.79 Other studies suggest a correlation between
the provision of permanent supportive housing and a decrease in costs
for incarceration, emergency room admissions, and behavioral health
care.80
The perennial debate over the cost-benefits of increasing support
and services versus increasing penalties and enforcement is a
fundamental and enduring tension.81 As explained below, this tension
persists in the latest method of homeless advocacy: the state-level
enactment of a homeless bill of rights.

77

These avoidance strategies do not mean the legislative body avoids a normative
judgment or action about whether positive rights should be afforded. To the contrary,
such inaction is in fact a normative choice that reinforces social and distributive
hierarchies that often disfavor minority rights. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative
Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2330 (1990) (making similar
observations and describing “governmental inaction [as] a choice . . . [that] reinforces
incentives which are already skewed against supervisory control over government
employees, and encourages the unbridled discretion which leads to unconstitutional
conduct.”)
78
See Cost Savings with Permanent Supportive Housing, NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END
HOMELESSNESS (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/costsavings-with-permanent-supportive-housing (charting the changes in state
expenditures pre- and post-placement of homeless individuals in permanent
supportive housing across four cities and one state); see also Cost of Homelessness,
NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.
endhomelessness.org/pages/cost_of_homelessness (surveying various studies
concluding that permanent housing options are more cost-effective than the provision
of temporary shelter).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See generally HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 68 (arguing that all rights cost
money, and therefore debates over the allocation and recognition of rights are, at their
core, debates over the cost-benefit of those rights).
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III. CASE STUDIES: CURRENT EFFORTS TO ADVANCE HOMELESS BILLS OF
RIGHTS
Homeless bills of rights present the threshold question of whether
the government should make statutory commitments to positive or
negative rights for the homeless. Other inquiries logically follow: if the
government makes such statutory commitments, what should the
scope of those commitments be? Should they be aspirational? Or must
they be capable of sustained implementation by government agencies?
If the commitments are expected to improve the circumstances of
homeless people, what redress should exist if the government fails to
deliver on its commitments?
Several American jurisdictions are spotlighting these
conversations by proposing, and in some instances enacting, statewide
homeless bills of rights. This section offers a brief overview of
significant developments in Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, and California.
A. Puerto Rico: An Administrative Approach to Rights
In 1998, Puerto Rico broke a barrier in U.S. homeless advocacy.
It was the first U.S. territory to pass a homeless bill of rights, a legislative
declaration of specific rights that belong to Puerto Rico’s homeless
citizens. Few mainland advocates interviewed for this Article reported
knowing much or—in some instances—knowing anything about
Puerto Rico’s homeless bill of rights. Indeed, at the time of this
writing, no other English scholarship has reported or evaluated Puerto
Rico’s homeless rights legislation.82 The lack of mainland knowledge
regarding Puerto Rico’s laws might be attributed to geographical
distance and separation, distinctions between Puerto Rico’s civil law
tradition and the mainland’s common law tradition, language barriers,
or real or perceived cultural or demographic differences.83 In any
82

Efforts to locate Spanish legal scholarship on Puerto Rico’s Homeless Bill of
Rights laws were also unsuccessful.
83
The impact of Puerto Rico’s culture, civil law tradition, and demographics
present a rich and complex area for continued research. A very limited handful of
studies suggest some starting points for legal scholarship to examine the impacts of
these socio-cultural variables on the recognition of homeless rights, social welfare or
positive rights, perceptions of agency, and the role of the state. See, e.g., Julia &
Harnett, supra note 37, at 318–30 (analyzing cultural, demographic, and social
differences between homelessness in Puerto Rico and in Columbus, Ohio and
concluding, in part, that socio-cultural variables “such as familialism and
intergenerational dependency” are unique and critical influences in Puerto Rican
homelessness); Aileen Torres, Aida Garcia-Carrasquillo & Juan Nogueras,
Sociodemographic Variables, Childhood Characteristics, and Family Risk Factors for
Homelessness: A “Puerto Rican Paradox?”, 32 HISP. J. OF BEHAVIORAL SCI. 4, 532–48 (2010)
(supporting Julia and Harnett’s “proposal that family factors are more salient
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event, Puerto Rico’s unique model is a compelling source of study and
future research. As described below, Puerto Rico’s provision of a
broad range of positive and negative rights is unparalleled by any
enacted legislation on the mainland. But the substantive scope of
Puerto Rico’s law is not the only unique contrast with the mainland
states; Puerto Rico’s law also articulates a detailed administrative
scheme for homeless rights unlike any other.
Puerto Rico is also a unique jurisdiction for homeless rights
because the Constitution of Puerto Rico, adopted in 1952, specifically
identifies the homeless as a suspect class.84 Still, abuses of homeless
rights increased during the 1990s.85 In 1998, Puerto Rico passed Act
250 to “provide services for the homeless, [and] to implement a wellintegrated public policy that will allow these persons to meet their basic
needs and have their rights respected.”86
Conceived as an
administrative plan to mitigate homelessness, Act 250 established a
commission within the Department of the Family, which was tasked
with coordinating the efforts of government agencies, the private
sector, and nonprofits.87 The role of the Commission was to determine
the best course of action to implement public policy regarding the
homeless in Puerto Rico, focusing on housing, health, employment
and income, and access to government services.88 Act 250 was not
intended to be judicially enforceable; instead, the creation,
predictors of risk in [Puerto Rico’s homeless] population than other
sociodemographic variables such as poverty and education levels” and proposing
future research analyze “collectivism, interdependence, familismo, and
multigenerational households and their relationship to homelessness”). There is a
similar dearth of scholarship examining the impact of Puerto Rico’s civil law tradition
on social, cultural, political, and legal consciousness; such scholarship could help
guide future research on Puerto Rico’s Homeless Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Marta
Figueroa-Torres, Recodification of Civil law in Puerto Rico: A Quixotic Pursuit of the Civil
Code for the New Millennium, 12.1 ELECTRONIC J. OF COMP. L. (May 2008), available at
http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-21.pdf.
84
See Telephone interview with Osvaldo Burgos Pérez, Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights and Constitutional Law Society and Professor of Law
at the University of Puerto Rico School of Law (Feb. 27, 2013); see also Telephone
interview with Glorin Ruiz Pastush, Volunteer at La Fondita de Jesus (Feb. 22, 2013).
The Puerto Rico Constitution specifically recognizes “the right of every person to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
and especially to food, clothing, housing, and medical care, and necessary social
services.” P. R. CONST. art. II, § 20. The Constitution also specifically prohibits
discrimination on the basis of “social condition.” P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1.
85
P.R. CONST. art. II § 1. See also Interview with Pastush, supra note 84.
86
Act No. 250, 13th Leg., 3d Sess. (P.R. 1998) (repealed 2007).
87
Id. The new commission, the Commission for the Implementation of the Public
Policy Regarding the Homeless, was structured as a committee chaired by the Secretary
of the Department of the Family.
88
Id. at 6–10.
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implementation, and enforcement of the law was entirely vested in the
Commission.89
Shortly thereafter, in 2000, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto
Rico90 observed that “the homeless have rights in Puerto Rico . . . but
on many occasions, due to their health, financial and social conditions,
they do not know or are unable to claim their rights.” Accordingly, the
Assembly passed Act 277.91 The purpose of Act 277 is to “impart . . .
legitimacy not only to the homeless, but also to any representative of
any assisting organization, be it public or private.”92 Act 277 allows
advocacy groups to serve as “intercessors” for homeless individuals and
act on their behalf in legal proceedings.93 It also requires that the court
try cases involving homeless individuals through quicker summary
proceedings and waive court fees.94
Despite these advances, by 2007, the Assembly noted that the
Commission had “not developed models to address the homeless
situation.”95 Realizing that the government was only one among many
different service providers for the homeless, the Assembly decided that
a multi-sector approach would be more effective.96 In September of
2007, the Assembly repealed Act 250 and replaced it with Act 130,
which created a Multi-Sector Homeless Population Support Council.97
The new Act 130 “aims to achieve the goal of eradicating
homelessness . . . [and] make Puerto Rico a place where all human
beings have a roof over their heads, and prompt and sensitive access to
the basic services every human being is entitled to receive.”98 The Act
89

Id.
Act No. 277, 13th Leg., 7th Sess. (P.R. 2000). The Asamblea Legislativa de
Puerto Rico is the territorial legislature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which
is responsible for the legislative branch of the government of Puerto Rico. The
Legislative Assembly is a bicameral legislature consisting of an upper house, the
Senate, and the lower house, the House of Representatives. Every bill must be passed
by both houses and signed by the Governor of Puerto Rico to become law. The
structure and responsibilities of the Legislative Assembly are defined in Constitution
of Puerto Rico which vests all legislative power in the Legislative Assembly. In relevant
respects, the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico is comparable to the bicameral
structure and process of other state legislative bodies on the mainland. See generally
Asamblea Legislativa, OSLPR.ORG, http://www.oslpr.org/new/asamblealegislativa.aspx
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
91
Act No. 277, 13th Leg., 7th Sess. (P.R. 2000).
92
Id.
93
Id. at § 698.
94
Id. at § 691–701.
95
Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess. (P.R. 2007).
96
Id. at 14.
97
Id. at 21.
98
Id.
90

RANKIN (DO NOT DELETE)

402

4/12/2015 9:28 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:383

enumerates several positive and negative rights guaranteed to the
homeless, including the right to shelter;99 nourishment;100 medical
attention;101 all social services and benefits for which they qualify;102
workforce training;103 protection from law enforcement officers against
any kind of mistreatment;104 and free access to parks, town squares, and
other public facilities.105
Like the Commission created under Act 250, the Multi-Sector
Council created under Act 130 was similarly situated in the
Department of the Family and chaired by its Secretary.106 However, in
addition to retaining the former Commission’s purpose of
implementing and developing policy and strategy, the Council was also
tasked with “seeking and developing new options” to provide services
and housing for the homeless.107 The twenty-one member Council is
comprised of nine members from the government sector, nine
members from a coalition of homeless services—two of whom must
have experienced homelessness—and one member from the private
sector.108 Like its predecessor, Act 130 is not judicially enforceable;
instead, it tasks the Council with responsibility for designing protocols
to ensure agency implementation of the enumerated rights and with
responsibility for enforcing compliance.109
In December 2007, a few months after the passage of Act 130,
members of the Assembly noted the persistent lack of protocols to
facilitate access to public services.110 That month, the Assembly enacted
Act 199, which required all government departments and agencies to
establish protocols for the access and rendering of services to the
homeless and to establish awareness trainings on homeless rights.111
Act 199 also announced plans to publish these protocols for public
inspection, thereby increasing accountability of service providers,
including the government.112
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at § 5(a)(1).
Id. at § 5(a)(2).
Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess § 5(a)(3) (P.R. 2007).
Id. at § 5(a)(4).
Id. at § 5(a)(5).
Id. at § 5(a)(6).
Id. at § 5(a)(8).
Id.
Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess § 5(a)(8) (P.R. 2007).
Id.
Id. at § 6.
S.B. 1455, 15th Leg., 6th Sess., at 1–2 (P.R. 2007).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
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Most recently, in 2012, another bill for the protection of the
homeless was introduced in the Puerto Rico House. The proposed bill,
3912, noted that, despite prior legislation, “very little has been
achieved in advancing the effort to improve the situation of
homelessness.”113 To address this perceived lack of progress, 3912
proposed specific procedures for identifying and treating homeless
people suffering from substance abuse, physical, or mental health
issues.114
In many respects, Puerto Rico’s Homeless Bill of Rights is
visionary. Puerto Rico’s consistent enactment of homeless rights
legislation over nearly two decades suggests that the notion of
homeless rights may not be as politically divisive or as socially
unpopular as it appears in many mainland jurisdictions.115 The law
articulates a broad range of positive and negative rights that many
mainland advocates identify as ideal. Moreover, as explained below,
Puerto Rico’s administrative scheme also resonates with many social
movement analyses, which observe that any fundamental change in
human rights must engage not only the legislative branch, but also
administrative entities.116
But many homeless advocates in Puerto Rico believe that the law,
while substantively strong, has not been properly implemented or
enforced.117 Some of these failures clearly relate to limited resources.
For example, the Council is housed in the Department of Family,
which has a broad set of responsibilities that distract it from sufficiently
addressing the demands of Act 130.118 Indeed, the president of the
Council is the Secretary of the Department of Family, and she has been
“too busy” to preside over the Council’s meetings.119 Moreover, the
administrative scheme is wracked by conflicts of interest: the Council
is responsible for designing, implementing, and enforcing the law; the

113

P. of C. 3912, SENADO.PR.GOV (Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.senadopr.
us/Proyectos%20del%20Senado/pc3912-ta.pdf.
114
Id.
115
Interview with Francisco de Jesus, former attorney and current volunteer at La
Fondita de Jesus (Feb. 25, 2013) (noting that Puerto Rico’s political parties generally
agree on policies that support homeless rights; “[t]he most difficult part is the
implementation; once you’ve achieved that [policy].”).
116
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
117
Interview with Osvaldo Burgos Pérez, supra note 83; Interview with Francisco de
Jesus, supra note 115; Interview with Pastush, supra note 84; Telephone interview with
Tim Sherwood, retired professor of humanities and current volunteer with La Fondita
de Jesus (Feb. 25, 2013).
118
See Interview with Pérez, supra note 84.
119
Interview with Sherwood, supra note 117.
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law can impose administrative fines of up to $5,000 per violation.120 But
nearly half of the Council’s twenty-one members are also heads of the
government agencies responsible for implementing the law.121
Accordingly, advocates are pushing for new legislation to either
relocate the Council in the Housing Department, where some
advocates see a more logical fit with issues affecting the homeless,122 or
to convert the Council into a more autonomous or quasi-governmental
agency, perhaps comparable to the Civil Rights Commission.123
The challenge of implementation has sparked some interest in
amending the law to provide for judicial enforceability;124 the hope is,
of course, that mobilizing judicial protections of homeless rights will
result in more effective implementation and enforcement. As
explained below, judicial enforcement might serve such a role, but the
outcomes can be highly contextual and varied.125 Certainly, Puerto
Rico’s unique administrative plan articulates ambitious goals for the
island’s homeless residents. But if the legislation still lacks sufficient
implementation and enforcement, does it have a meaningful impact
on homeless rights? Rhode Island’s experience provides helpful
comparisons.
B. Rhode Island: A Blueprint of Negative Rights
On June 20, 2012, Rhode Island became the first mainland state
to pass a homeless bill of rights; as such, it has quickly become a model
for many other mainland U.S. advocates that are evaluating similar
legislation. Indeed, at the time of this writing, Illinois126 and
Connecticut127 already passed homeless bills of rights based on the
Rhode Island template. Hawaii, Oregon, Vermont, Missouri, and
Massachusetts base their bills on Rhode Island’s model, but have yet to
120

Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess § 7(k) (P.R. 2007).
Interview with Sherwood, supra note 117.
122
Id. But not all interviewed advocates favor relocation of the Council to another
agency department. See, e.g., Interview with Pérez, supra note 84.
123
Interview with Sherwood, supra note 116; Interview with Pérez, supra note 84;
Interview with Francisco de Jesus, supra note 115; Interview with Pastush, supra note
84.
124
Interview with Pérez, supra note 84 (discussing the advantages of judicial
enforceability, but stressing that those advantages cannot be realized without adequate
access to counsel and to the judicial process).
125
See infra Part IV.C.
126
Bill of Rights for the Homeless Act, Pub. L. 098-0516, 2013 Ill. Laws, available at
http://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/98/PDF/098-0516.pdf; see also Table 1, CrossJurisdictional Comparison of Provisions.
127
Homeless Person’s Bill of Rights, Pub. L. 13-251, 2013 Conn. Acts 1714; see also
Table 1, Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of Provisions.
121
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enact such a law.128
Even as a prototype, Rhode Island’s motivations for the bill are
common: the recent economic downturn and a lack of affordable
housing transformed Rhode Island’s homeless relief efforts into a
“system bursting at the seams.”129 Since 2008, the number of homeless
Rhode Islanders has increased by 24 percent.130 Annual statistics from
2011 to 2012 show a 12.6 percent increase in homeless families; a 16.9
percent increase in homeless children; and a 23 percent increase in
homeless veterans.131 Rhode Island’s shelters, already stretched
beyond capacity, have been unable to accommodate the influx of
newly homeless individuals.132 Homeless individuals seeking jobs face
persistent discrimination from employers on the basis of their housing
status, creating persistent barriers to employment.133 Service providers
report that homeless clients routinely face harassment and
discrimination, not just from housed individuals generally, but also
specifically from city service workers, such as police and bus drivers.134
Despite these grim prospects, in 2011, the Rhode Island legislature cut
funding for a supportive housing plan earmarked for helping
homeless people return to stable living situations.135 In response,
homeless advocates gained the support of a few legislators, who
introduced several bills to assist homeless Rhode Islanders.136 One of
these bills was the Rhode Island Homeless Bill of Rights, which was

128

H.B. 1205, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013); H.B. 3122, 77th. 2013 Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2013); H. 493, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2013); S.B. 428, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2013); H.B. 3595, 188th. Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013). See also Table 1, CrossJurisdictional Comparison of Provisions.
129
Tracey O’Neill, RI’s Homeless Numbers Climb by More Than Ten Percent, GO LOCAL
PROV (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.golocalprov.com/news/ris-homeless-numbersclimb-by-more-than-ten-percent/.
130
Id.
131
Statistics on the Homeless In Rhode Island, RHODE ISLAND COALITION FOR THE
HOMELESS,
http://www.rihomeless.org/AboutHomelessness/HomelessnessStatistics/tabid/248/
Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
132
Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64.
133
Telephone interview with John Tassoni, Jr., State Senator, Rhode Island State
Senate (Feb. 27, 2013).
134
Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64.
135
Id.
136
These bills included S. 2203, a bill to fund supportive and affordable housing,
and S. 2307, a bill requiring banks to allow residents in foreclosure to remain in their
homes by paying rent. Both S. 2203 and S. 2307 remain in Committee. See Passing the
Homeless Bill of Rights, RHODE ISLAND COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (Apr. 7, 2013),
http://www.rihomeless.org/Resources/HomelessBillofRights/HomelessBillofRights
Passage/tabid/275/Default.aspx.
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enacted just a few months later.137
The Rhode Island Homeless Bill of Rights was passed as an
amendment to the state’s Fair Housing Practices Act.138 It specifically
incorporates the state’s constitutional equal protection provisions139
and provides that “[n]o person’s rights, privileges, or access to public
services may be denied or abridged solely because he or she is
homeless.”140 The statute enumerates seven negative rights for
homeless Rhode Islanders: the right to (1) “use and move freely in
public spaces;”141 (2) “equal treatment from all state and municipal
agencies;”142 (3) be free from employment discrimination based on
housing status;143 (4) receive emergency medical care without
discrimination based on housing status;144 (5) vote;145 (6) nondisclosure or confidentiality of public records;146 and (7) “a reasonable
expectation of privacy” for personal property.147
The law does not grant homeless Rhode Islanders any new or
special rights; indeed, it expressly provides that these rights are “the
same rights and privileges as any other resident” of Rhode Island.148
These rights, however, are judicially enforceable. Accordingly,
aggrieved plaintiffs can seek “injunctive and declaratory relief, actual
damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs” if their rights are
violated under the new law.149

137

S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2012).
One result of the amendment to the state’s Fair Housing Practices Act is to add
“housing status” to a list of explicitly articulated groups that are afforded protection
against housing discrimination, including “race, color, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, country of ancestral origin,
or disability, age, familial status” or victims of domestic violence. Id. at § 34-37-1(b).
139
Id. at § 34-37.1-2(2).
140
Id. at § 34-37.1-3.
141
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(1).
142
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(2).
143
S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 34-37.1-3(3) (R.I. 2012).
144
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(4).
145
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(5) (prohibiting discrimination in voter registration and other
voting-related processes).
146
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(6) (providing the “right to protection from disclosure of his
or her records and information provided to homeless shelters and service providers to
state, municipal and private entities without appropriate legal authority; and the right
to confidentiality of personal records and information in accordance with all
limitations on disclosure [under federal law]”).
147
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(7) (the right to privacy of personal property is co-extensive to
“personal property in a permanent residence”).
148
Id. at § 34-37.1-3.
149
S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 34-37.1-4 (R.I. 2012).
138
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The bill was amended during the legislative process, shedding
light on substantive and strategic negotiations between Rhode Island
advocates and policymakers. Like many advocates nationwide, Rhode
Island advocates viewed the right to housing and anti-criminalization
efforts as top priorities.150 Accordingly, the original draft humanized
the problem of homelessness, grounding the legislation in the
“fundamental belief [that] no person should suffer unnecessarily from
cold or hunger, or be deprived of housing or the basic rights incident
to such shelter from the elements.”151 The original draft also proposed
several positive rights, such as the right to certain public services and
benefits152 and to legal counsel.153 These provisions, however, were
narrowly drafted to confirm these rights were either co-extensive with
those already afforded to “any” citizen154 or were subject to existing
eligibility guidelines.155 Perhaps the most ambitious (and therefore,
controversial) provision in the original draft guaranteed “the right to
fair, decent and affordable housing in the community of his or her
choosing, and access to safe and proximate shelter until such housing
can be attained.”156 Advocates knew the right to housing provision was
a long shot; the legislature would likely perceive such a provision as too
costly and reject it out of hand.157 But after extensive discussion,
including consultation with homeless Rhode Islanders, advocates felt
the right to housing was too important not to include.158 Even the
proposal of a right to housing could serve as a “rallying cry” for
constituents and spark important conversations about the dire housing
conditions for many Rhode Island adults and children.159

150

Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64.
S. 2052, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 34-37.1-2(2) (R.I. 2012), available at
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText12/SenateText12/S2052.pdf.
152
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(9) (confirming “the right to receive public benefits and
services offered to any other citizen of this state in accordance with the established
eligibility guidelines for those services”).
153
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(7) (providing “the right to legal counsel equal to that extended
to any other citizen of the state”).
154
Id.
155
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(9) (confirming “the right to receive public benefits and
services offered to any other citizen of this state in accordance with the established
eligibility guidelines for those services”).
156
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(4) (providing “the right to fair, decent and affordable housing
in the community of his or her choosing, and access to safe and proximate shelter until
such housing can be attained”).
157
Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64.
158
Id. (describing one consideration as, “Can’t we just have the fight first, before
we pull out the provision?”).
159
Id.
151

RANKIN (DO NOT DELETE)

408

4/12/2015 9:28 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:383

As advocates predicted, the original draft’s emphasis on social
welfare rights such as hunger and housing was softened significantly in
the revised Substitute A—presumably to remove any suggestion that
the state would be obligated to address problems such as cold, hunger,
or housing issues. Instead, the statement of legislative intent was
reframed to emphasize the problem of discrimination. As revised,
Substitute A articulated the “fundamental belief [that] no person
should suffer unnecessarily or be subject to unfair discrimination
based on his or her homeless status.”160 Substitute A also removed
advocates’ preferred provisions for the right to certain services and
benefits and to legal counsel, despite the fact that these provisions were
narrowly drafted and ultimately announced already existing rights.
Perhaps less surprisingly, the controversial right to housing and shelter
provision was also removed.
Although advocates lost some ground in Substitute A, the new
draft gave clearer emphasis to advocates’ other priority of decriminalizing homelessness. First, Substitute A revised the “right to
equal treatment by all police departments” to a more precise “right to
equal treatment by all law enforcement agencies . . . including the right
to be free from searches or detention based upon his or her actual or
perceived housing status.”161 Substitute A also articulated a new
provision: “the right not to be subject to criminal sanctions for resting
or sleeping in a public place in a non-obstructive manner when there
is no available and accessible shelter space.”162 Both of these provisions
directly confronted various municipal and state laws that advocates
maintain criminalize the conduct of life-sustaining activities in
public.163
Unfortunately for homeless Rhode Islanders, neither of
Substitute A’s new criminalization provisions survived in the final,
enacted bill. Law enforcement agencies reacted negatively to being
singled out for the “equal protection” provision, so advocates struck a
compromise by broadening the language to encompass “all state and
municipal agencies.”164 On the one hand, this development could be
perceived as an improvement because the right to equal protection
now arguably covers not only law enforcement agencies but also all

160

S. 2052, Sub. A, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 34-37.1-2(3) (R.I. 2012),
available at http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText12/SenateText12/S2052A.pdf.
161
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(2).
162
Id. at § 34-37.1-3(4).
163
Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1 (2013)
(prohibits the obstruction of sidewalk or building entrance).
164
Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64.
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other state and municipal agencies. The broader language, however,
could also be perceived as obscuring advocates’ efforts to spotlight the
specific role of law enforcement in violating the basic rights of
homeless Rhode Islanders.165 Moreover, the compromised language
no longer articulated the right to “be free from searches or detention”
based on one’s status as a homeless person. This omission, combined
with the removal of “the right not to be subject to criminal sanctions
for resting or sleeping in a public place,” scrubbed the bill of any
specific provisions to combat the criminalization of homelessness.166
Still, advocates felt the revised Substitute B was a significant
development: it would be the first state law to specifically focus on the
basic rights of homeless citizens, it drew some attention to problems of
discrimination against the homeless, and it fortified seven
fundamental negative rights that were not being realized for Rhode
Island’s homeless citizens.167 Accordingly, Substitute B, the final
version of the bill, was passed the last day of the legislative session.168
Because Rhode Island’s bill was the first to be successfully enacted
on the mainland, it is unsurprising that most mainland jurisdictions
have adopted Rhode Island’s as a model.169 Illinois and Connecticut
recently enacted homeless bills of rights inspired by Rhode Island;
Oregon, Missouri, Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts are among the
states considering similar legislation.170 Based on Rhode Island’s
template, many of these state proposals include the right to (1) move
freely in public spaces, (2) receive equal treatment by state and
municipal authorities, (3) be free from discrimination while seeking
165

See generally 2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31 (discussing the role of law
enforcement in constitutional and civil violations of homeless people’s rights). See
generally 2014 NLCHP Report, supra note 31.
166
The removal of the right to rest in public spaces came as a surprise to advocates;
the provision easily passed the Senate on the last day of the legislative session, and
advocates did not learn it was removed later that day in the House until the law was
already passed. Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64 (describing the removal of the
anti-criminalization measure as occurring “off the radar”).
167
Id. (explaining that it would have been “counterproductive to complain” about
the removal of the anti-criminalization provision in light of the passage of the overall
bill); Interview with Tassoni, supra note 133 (stressing that housing and employment
discrimination was still a significant issue for homeless Rhode Islanders and thus a
significant “short term” target for advocates).
168
S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2012).
169
Most mainland advocates interviewed for this Article had not heard of Puerto
Rico’s legislation or did not know much about it. Although this Article reports on
Puerto Rico’s legislation to provoke comparisons and contrasts with emerging laws on
the mainland, further research should examine Puerto Rico’s potential as a model for
mainland advocacy.
170
See supra note 128.
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or maintaining employment, (4) receive emergency medical care, (5)
vote, register to vote, and receive documentation necessary for voter
registration, (6) be protected from disclosure of information or
records conveyed to a temporary residence such as a shelter, and (7)
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding personal property.171 Most
of the proposals also allow for reasonable attorney’s fees for prevailing
plaintiffs.172 Some also amend existing law to add a definition of
“housing status” to either the housing or civil rights code.173
Rhode Island and Puerto Rico enacted the first two homeless bills
of rights in the United States, and some rudimentary but helpful
contrasts can be drawn between them. First, Puerto Rico’s law is far
more expansive, both in terms of its longer history (the first law was
enacted in 1998), the number of laws encompassed within it (Puerto
Rico has enacted over half a dozen significant laws relating to homeless
rights), and the scope of the provisions (Puerto Rico provides not only
negative rights, but also a broad range of positive rights, including
rights to shelter, food, job training, and healthcare).174 By contrast, the
new Rhode Island law articulates seven negative rights, all of which are
rights that are currently afforded to housed citizens. Moreover, the
Rhode Island statute does not anticipate an administrative scheme.
Unlike Puerto Rico’s plans for administrative design, implementation,
and enforcement of homeless rights, the Rhode Island law centers on
judicial enforcement.175
Some could question whether Rhode Island’s law can produce
meaningful change.176 In the most critical light, Rhode Island’s model
could be criticized for bending on advocates’ top priorities such as a
right to housing, right to counsel, anti-criminalization, and provisions
specifically identifying the need for equal treatment from law
enforcement. The result, some might argue, is that the Rhode Island
law articulates rights already enjoyed by everyone—whether housed or
homeless. The Rhode Island law does not articulate any new rights
171

See Table 1, Cross-Jurisdictional Comparisons of Provisions.
Id.
173
Id.
174
See generally Act No. 250, 13th Leg., 3d Sess. (P.R. 1998) (repealed 2007); Act
No. 277, 13th Leg., 7th Sess. (P.R. 2000); Act No. 130, 15th Leg., 6th Sess. (P.R. 2007).
Compare Act No. 250, Act No. 277, and Act No. 130 with S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2012).
175
S. 2052, Sub. B, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 34-37.1-4 (R.I. 2012).
176
See, e.g., Interview with Arms, supra note 65 (admiring Rhode Island’s
accomplishments but opining that “Rhode Island’s model is probably not strong
enough” for California’s needs); Interview with Eisinger, supra note 64 (opining that
the “priority” is affordable housing and any homeless bill of rights that does not
advance housing could distract legislators from taking more important action).
172
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and arguably does not address the most pressing needs of homeless
people.
But others insist that even incremental progress is progress, and
Rhode Island advocates are advancing an incremental strategy.177
Rhode Island advocates plan to wait a year or so and gather evidence
of how the law is working. If necessary, they plan to return to the
legislature and ask for amendments to fix areas that may not be
working well.178 Such a longer-term, incremental strategy may be
particularly fitting for Rhode Island, where advocacy is constrained by
a legislative session of approximately five to six months, shorter than
some other jurisdictions.179 As explained below, even modest,
incremental gains can help to precipitate progressive rights reform.
C. California: Mainland Ambitions for Positive Rights
California’s bill is a canary in a coal mine.180

Although originally modeled after the Rhode Island Homeless
Bill of Rights, the California bill—proposing a broad range of twentythree rights—was markedly different out the chute. California
Assemblyman, Tom Ammiano, first introduced the Homeless Person’s
Bill of Rights and Fairness Act on December 3, 2012.181 In April 2013,
the first amended bill passed the California Assembly’s Judiciary
Committee by a majority vote of 7 to 3.182 The bill was originally

177

Galanter, infra note 264, at 127 (discussing social movements and incremental
progress). All advocates interviewed for this Article appreciated the practical value of
incremental advocacy. See, e.g., Interview with Arms, supra note 65; Interview with
Pastush, supra note 84 (noting advocates’ desire to achieve greater progress, but noting
the current law is “better than nothing”); Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64
(explaining shortcomings in the current law, but stating, “When politicians do
something good, and you come back and say, ‘You didn’t do it good enough,’ they
don’t react well to that.”).
178
Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64.
179
See, e.g., Dates of 2013 State Legislative Sessions, BALLOTPEDIA (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://ballotpedia.org/Dates_of_2013_state_legislative_sessions.
Rhode Island’s
legislative session is roughly comparable to the duration of most other states using
Rhode Island’s law as a model, including Hawaii’s 2013 legislative session of
approximately four months, and 2013 sessions in Missouri, Oregon, Illinois, and
Connecticut of approximately five months. See id. California has a relatively long
legislative session—approximately nine months. See id. This longer legislative session
may support different substantive and strategic choices in California than in the other
reviewed states.
180
Interview with Arms, supra note 65.
181
A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (introduced).
182
A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 4, 2012
and Apr. 30, 2012).
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expected to go to a full vote of the House Assembly in January 2014.183
But then the bill moved to the Appropriations Committee, which
suspended the bill, effectively killing it for the 2013 legislative
session.184 Soon after, advocates received the devastating news that the
bill’s original sponsor, Assemblyman Ammiano, was retiring and would
not reintroduce the bill in the 2014 legislative session. Without a
sponsor, California’s bill languished. But, California’s advocates are
not finished fighting,185 and the bill’s history (and perhaps the bill’s
eventual reincarnation) offers valuable insights.
The bill’s introductory language provides that “every person in
the state, regardless of actual or perceived housing status, income level,
mental illness, or physical disability, shall be free from specified forms
of discrimination and shall be entitled to certain basic human
rights.”186 It compares discrimination against the homeless to a long
legacy of discriminatory laws that have since been repudiated,
including Jim Crow laws from the segregation era, anti-Okie laws from
the 1930’s, which made it illegal to bring poor Dust Bowl immigrants
into California, and so-called “Ugly” laws which made it illegal for
persons with “unsightly or disgusting” disabilities to appear in public.187
The California bill provides negative rights similar to those in
Rhode Island, but also includes some of the advocates’ priorities that
were ultimately cut from Rhode Island’s bill, such as adequate housing
and shelter,188 access to legal counsel,189 equal treatment from law
enforcement,190 and anti-criminalization provisions.191 Also similar to
Rhode Island, the California bill contemplates judicial remedies for
aggrieved plaintiffs whose rights are violated.192
183

Bill History, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION (Feb. 10, 2015),
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml.
184
Telephone interview with Paul Boden, Organizing Director, Western Regional
Advocacy Project (Dec. 20, 2013).
185
See, e.g., Civil Rights Issues, WRAPHOME.ORG, http://wraphome.org/work/civilrights-issues (last visited Feb 18, 2015) (discussing “WRAP Civil Rights”).
186
A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 4, 2012
and Apr. 30, 2012).
187
Id. at § 2. The Western Regional Advocacy Project (WRAP), a key homeless
advocacy player in efforts to pass California’s bill, describes these historical analogues
in its Criminalization Fact Sheet.
Criminalization Fact Sheet, WRAPHOME.ORG,
http://wraphome.org/images/stories/wohotkpdf/criminalization%20fact%20sheetf
ix%20crossword.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
188
A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3(a)(2) (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr.
4, 2012 and Apr. 30, 2012).
189
Id. at § 53.2(a)(14)–(15).
190
Id. at § 53.2(a)(1)–(10).
191
Id.
192
Id. at § 53.6 (providing for injunctive and declaratory relief, actual,
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But California’s bill is hardly negative rights boilerplate from
Rhode Island: the California bill proposes more specific and detailed
language regarding the right to engage in life-sustaining activities in
public.193 Indeed, the original bill provided the right to urinate in
public; this provision provoked significant negative publicity and was
removed from the amended version.194 The amended version,
however, arguably serves the same interest by clarifying provisions for
sufficient public restrooms and hygienic supplies.195
The California bill contains several other noteworthy anticriminalization provisions that go beyond direct protections for
homeless people. The bill explicitly provides protections for third
parties that offer food or water to a homeless person, thus mooting
anti-food sharing laws.196 Moreover, the bill requires “every local law
enforcement agency” to compile annual statistics showing the
“number of citations, arrests, and other enforcement activities made
pursuant” to specifically illustrated criminalization or so-called “quality
of life” laws.197 Law enforcement must make these statistics publicly
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees).
193
The California bill also articulates several negative rights never formally
proposed in the Rhode Island legislation, including but not limited to the right to pray
or practice religion in public and the right to decline shelter and services. See id. at §
3(53.2)(8) (right to pray); Id. at § 3(53.2)(9) (right to decline shelter).
194
A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 53.3 (f) (Cal. 2012) (introduced).
Media coverage was decidedly negative. See, e.g., Editorial, Don’t Give the Homeless a Bill
of Rights, THE PRESS ENTERPRISE (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.pe.com/opinion/
editorials-headlines/20130109-editorial-dont-give-the-homeless-a-bill-of-rights.ece.
195
A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(c)(6) (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr.
30, 2012) (noting the need for “access to safe, clean restrooms, water, and hygienic
supplies” as particularly critical given “the proliferation of closures of public
restrooms”); Id. at § 53.4(a)–(c) (detailing the obligations of local governments to
provide “sufficient health and hygiene centers” and of the State Department of Public
Health to fund such centers so “at a minimum, [the centers] shall contain public
bathroom and shower facilities”). In this instance, the original draft’s provision for
the right to urinate—arguably a negative right—turned out to be more controversial
than the related positive rights to public restroom facilities and hygienic supplies.
Although the urination may have generated bad publicity and perhaps some bad will,
it might also have added leverage to efforts to secure restroom facilities and hygiene
supplies.
196
Id. at § 53.3(b) (providing that people or organizations sharing food with the
homeless “shall not be subject to criminal or civil sanctions, arrest or harassment by
law enforcement”). The original draft sought immunity from civil or criminal liability
for public employees offering “public resources” to a homeless person. A.B. 5, 2013–
14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3(53.4) (Cal. 2012) (introduced); however, the amended
version proposes only to protect such a public employee from employer retaliation for
such actions. A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3(53.3)(a) (Cal. 2012)
(amended Apr. 30, 2012).
197
A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 53.5(a) (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr.
30, 2012).
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available198 and annually report them to the state Attorney General’s
Office.199
California advocates are also pursuing positive rights never
formally proposed in Rhode Island,200 including “access to income
sufficient for survival;”201 “access to clean and safe facilities,” such as
shelters or drop-in centers “24 hours a day, seven days a week;”202
“access to safe, clean restrooms, water, and hygienic supplies;”203 and
access to non-emergency health care.204
Some of the substantive differences between California’s and
Rhode Island’s laws could be due, in part, to different strategic
opportunities. California’s longer legislative session allowed advocates
to propose a broader, more ambitious bill. Although California
advocates believed some of the original proposals would likely need to
be removed or softened, they also knew they had several months to
negotiate.205 Compared to the shorter sessions of Rhode Islandinspired states,206 California’s strategy suggests that states with longer
legislative sessions might be able to afford to start more aggressively.
But California’s opening strategy is not risk-free; a more expansive
opening strategy could generate ill-will or disengagement from
legislators who might view many of the provisions as non-starters.207
198

Id. at § 53.5(16)(b).
Id. at § 53.5(16)(c).
200
See Table 1, Cross-Jurisdictional Comparisons of Provisions.
201
A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3(a)(1) (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr.
30, 2012).
202
Id. at § 3(a)(3).
203
Id. at § 2(c)(7).
204
Id. at § 3(a)(5).
205
Among other significant revisions from the original bill was a change in the
number of existing laws the bill proposed to amend: the opening paragraph of the
original bill proposed to amend six different California codes. A.B. 5, 2013–14 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (introduced). The subsequent revision, however,
proposed to amend only two codes (the civil code and government code). A.B. 5,
2013–14 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (amended Apr. 30, 2012). None of the
interviewed advocates suggested it was an intentional strategy, but the original
proposal of the controversial negative right to urinate in public seemed to provide
some leverage to secure support for the positive right to sanitary facilities.
206
See supra note 179.
207
Homeless advocates recognize and regularly negotiate this delicate balance.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Elisa Della, Director of Neighborhood Justice Clinic,
East Bay Community Law Center (Feb. 20, 2012) (describing homeless bill of rights
strategies as “hoping for the moon, but willing to compromise with the stars”);
Interview with Arms, supra note 65 (explaining that advocates cannot push “a
conversation ender,” but need to “push the limits without being outrageous”);
Telephone interview with Steve Diaz, Community Organizer (Feb. 27, 2012) (noting
that if you “go in with a bang,” you can create the “political wiggle room” to
compromise).
199
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Some of the differences in jurisdictional approaches could also
stem from different perspectives on incremental approaches to
legislative advocacy. Although Rhode Island’s negative-rights-only
approach appears relatively safe compared to California’s, Rhode
Island advocates may have a longer-term view of incremental progress.
The Rhode Island bill, now enacted, provides a toehold for building
statewide homeless rights. Rhode Island advocates plan to monitor,
evaluate, and amend that toehold as necessary—a sort of “start small,
but grow slowly and steadily” perspective.208 By contrast, California’s
opening strategy suggests a different view of incremental progress, one
that requires a commitment to certain priorities before compromising
on others.
On the one hand, California’s approach avoids some potential
critiques of Rhode Island-inspired bills: even after the bill was passed
by the Judiciary Committee, California managed to preserve advocates’
priority positive rights (such as affordable housing, non-emergency
health care, and adequate sanitary facilities) as well as some of the
prized negative rights (such as anti-criminalization and equal
treatment from law enforcement). On the other hand, California’s
bill—however substantively preferable it might appear to some
advocates—has yet to be successfully enacted. Still, California’s bill
arguably made significant contributions to the homeless bill of rights
movement. Despite its ambitious provisions, the bill passed the
Judiciary Committee by a wide majority. The proposal itself sparked
important public discussion about the unfair treatment of homeless
Californians. Although there are no clear sponsors to reintroduce the
bill in the near future, Californian advocates promise that their efforts
are far from exhausted.209 As with all the enacted and proposed
homeless bills of rights, the relative risks and rewards to California’s
approach will be revealed in time.
IV. A HOMELESS RIGHTS REVOLUTION?
This section considers how homeless bills of rights might impact
efforts to advance the social and legal rights of homeless Americans.
Such inquiries into how the law “does or does not matter” to social
movements are commonly framed as legal mobilization analyses.210
208

See discussion supra part III.B.
See Interview with Boden, supra note 184.
210
Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN.
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 17, 19 (2006) [hereinafter McCann, Law and Social Movements]. As a
preliminary matter, many legal mobilization scholars reject the necessity or the efficacy
of legal practice as a tool for social reform, noting that the “law is a primary medium
209
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Legal mobilization examines how the law can advance or constrain
change, including how individuals might use the law to advance their
interests.211 Ultimately, “law is mobilized when a desire or want is
translated into an assertion of right or lawful claim.”212 Accordingly,
rights-based inquiries are at the core of legal mobilization.
The term “rights revolution” commonly refers to a specific
historical development: the perceived historical shift of Supreme
Court attention, away from an original, exclusive focus on the property
rights of businesses and wealthy individuals and toward a more
contemporary focus on creating, expanding, and delineating the
individual civil rights of ordinary citizens.213 The Supreme Court’s role
in the rights revolution left an indelible and dramatic mark on
American government, culture, and rights consciousness. Some
believe the Supreme Court’s role in the rights revolution provided
crucial and necessary support for the civil rights movement, but
scholars still vigorously debate the causes, propriety, and legacy of the
rights revolution.214
of social control and domination.” Michael McCann, Legal Mobilization and Social
Reform Movements: Notes on Theory and its Application, 11 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
SOC’Y 225, 229 (1991) [hereinafter McCann, Legal Mobilization] (discussing such
criticisms). In this view, the law contributes to the maintenance of status quo power
hierarchies and generally frustrates resistance. Id. at 229–30. Indeed, McCann
acknowledges this “double-edged” tension, but concludes that legal mobilization is an
“important innovation” for many American social movements because legal strategies
can be used “to open up closed processes, to win formal rights for citizen participation,
to dramatize public issues, and to provide leverage against dominant groups in
particular battles over policy.” Michael W. McCann & Helena Silverstein, Social
Movements and the American State: Legal Mobilization as a Strategy for Democratization, in A
DIFFERENT KIND OF STATE? POPULAR POWER AND DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 131, 132
(Gregory Albo et al. eds., Oxford U. Press, 1993). In other words, legal mobilization
is not the only dimension of a social movement, but it can “offer varying degrees of
opportunity or space for creative challenge” to existing patterns of social control and
domination. McCann, Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 230.
211
Frances Khan Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the
Political System, 77 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 690, 694 (1983) (“[W]hat the populace actually
receives from government is to a large extent dependent upon their willingness and
ability to assert and use the law on their own behalf.”). Legal mobilization analysts,
however, recognize the law can be “double-edged, at once upholding the larger
infrastructure of the status quo while providing limited opportunities for episodic
challenges and transformations in that ruling order.” McCann, Law and Social
Movements, supra note 210, at 19 (citing STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF
RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974) and GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)).
212
Zemans, supra note 211, at 694.
213
CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 2 (1998).
214
Such debates often center on the propriety of an activist judiciary in a
democratic society, the role of the judiciary in legitimizing rights, and by extension,
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Nonetheless, the rights revolution should not be limited as a
historical concept. Studies of “the” rights revolution inform the
potential for “new” rights revolutions that may have an analogous
impact on rights consciousness—and ultimately, social movements—
in America.215 In other words, the interpretive lens of the rights
revolution is not solely retrospective; it offers a compelling prospective
framework, particularly for segments of American society that
continue to suffer from systemic oppression and discrimination.
Homeless people indisputably fall into this category, and one aim of
this Article is to reframe the rights revolution framework to assess the
substantive and strategic potential of homeless bills of rights: how
might these new laws meaningfully advance the legal and civil rights of
homeless people?
One starting place is to gauge the necessary conditions for a rights
revolution and to determine whether these conditions might exist in
the context of homeless bills of rights. Scholars generally describe the
following four factors as conditions necessary to a successful rights
revolution: (1) a strong bill of rights or other rights-based constitutions
or charters; (2) the presence of a “support structure for legal
mobilization, consisting of rights-advocacy organizations, rightsadvocacy lawyers, and sources of financing;” (3) an independent,
activist judiciary; and (4) a culture of rights consciousness or a culture
that frames disputes in terms of rights.216 Application of these four
necessary conditions to homeless rights advocacy suggests dismal
prospects; however, such a sobering preliminary assessment does not
the necessity of judicial enforcement for successful social movements. See, e.g., Sarah
Staszak, Realizing the Rights Revolution: Litigation and the American State, 38 LAW & SOCIAL
INQUIRY 222–45 (2013); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 25 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993); MARK TUSHNET,
THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Am. Hist. Ass’n 2009); Ann
Southworth, The Rights Revolution and Support Structures for Rights Advocacy, 34 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 1203, 1208 (2000); EPP, supra note 213, at 4.
215
Scholars have used rights revolution studies to assess the potential for new rights
revolutions in other countries. See, e.g., Bruce Wilson, Institutional Reform and Rights
Revolutions in Latin America: The Cases of Costa Rica and Colombia, 1 J. POL. IN LATIN AM.
59 (2009) (looking at Colombian and Costa Rican court rules about access, standing,
and formality that allowed for rights revolutions without extensive resources and
support structures); E. S. Herron and K. A. Randazzo, The Relationship Between
Independence and Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts, 65 J. POL. 422 (2003) (noting
that despite constitutional grants of power to the judiciary in the former communist
bloc countries, informal factors such as economic conditions, executive power, and
litigant’s identity affect how the courts operate); Lisa Conant, Individuals, Courts, and
the Development of European Social Rights, 39 COMP. POL STUD. 76 (2006) (discussing
power of the supra-national courts and ease of access influence on expansion of rights
in Europe).
216
EPP, supra note 213, at 3.
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doom the potential influence of homeless bills of rights.
A. America’s Rights Charters
The first necessary condition for a rights revolution, a strong bill
of rights and constitutional rights, might bode well for American
society on a general scale, but not necessarily on a specific scale for the
homeless. The presence of federal and state constitutions does not
translate into positive rights for homeless people. The constitutional
predisposition to positive rights—such as a right to shelter, health care,
or sustenance—is decidedly adverse: constitutional positive rights
generally do not thrive at the federal level because the federal
constitution is a negative charter,217 and such positive rights may not
thrive at the state level because courts are reluctant to impose positive
right obligations on state legislatures, even when an affirmative
constitutional obligation is found.218
In fact, of the fifty-one
jurisdictions analyzed for this Article, twenty-nine of the state
constitutions provide some degree of social welfare rights that
implicate the homeless; however, many of the specific rights that
homeless advocates prioritize do not appear to be realized by these
constitutional charters.219 Moreover, many of the fundamental civil
and constitutional rights most treasured in America—rights to privacy,
property, and freedom from discrimination—are routinely and
especially denied to homeless Americans.220 Indeed, it is precisely these
denials of civil and constitutional rights that spur interest in homeless
bills of rights.

217

TUSHNET, supra note 67, at 1895 (describing the rejection of constitutional
welfare rights as “conventional wisdom”); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203
(7th Cir. 1983) (calling the U.S. Constitution “a charter of negative rather than
positive liberties”). But other scholars contend the Bill of Rights contains positive
rights. See, e.g., Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 52–54; Susan H. Bitensky,
Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to
the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550 (1992); Bandes, supra note
77, at 2271; compare Cross, supra note 66, at 873 (reviewing these perspectives and
concluding “the rights recognized in the Constitution are not perfectly negative, [but]
they are overwhelmingly oriented that way”).
218
Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions,
33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 819 (2002).
219
Id. Indeed, as discussed below, due to challenges such as implementation bias,
the statutory articulation of social welfare rights—such as those articulated in homeless
bills of rights—does not necessarily improve rights-based prospects for homeless
people. See infra note 247.
220
See supra note 74.
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B. Support Structures and Financing
Poverty and marginalization undercut the ability of the homeless
to capitalize on the second “necessary condition” for a rights
revolution: support structures, including material resources.221
According to Charles Epp, rights advocacy also demands significant
and sustained financial resources, including government-supported
financing.222 To some, Epp’s argument may seem cynical: do rights
really come down to money? But ignoring the role of material
resources in rights advocacy is “wholly unjustified,” Epp contends,
particularly given the historical reality of an uneven “litigation playing
field.”223 Moreover, “the judicial process is costly and slow and
produces changes in the law only in small increments, [so] litigants
cannot hope to bring about meaningful change in the law unless they
have access to significant resources.”224
But homelessness is associated with a relative lack of organization,
power, and financial resources.225 Deficits in support structures then
affect the potential for homeless rights advocacy and legal
mobilization.226 Homeless people generally face significant obstacles
to secure social change through the courts or through the legislative
process. Courts often punt on matters of social or economic legislation
because judges “presume any problems will be remedied within the

221

EPP, supra note 213, at 3.
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. Epp’s point relates to an extensive body of social science literature
concerning the role of social movement organizations, or SMOs, to accomplish
change; SMOs also tend to be successful “repeat players” that can secure favorable
outcomes through the courts. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–99 (1974)
(explaining that individuals or organizations that occasionally access the courts are
less successful in leveraging litigation to bring about social and political change than
are “repeat player” litigants—such as affluent individuals and corporations—who can
afford to engage in similar pieces of litigation over time); Beth Harris, Representing
Homeless Families: Repeat Player Implementation Strategies, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 911 (1999)
(discussing how poverty lawyers can leverage power in judicial, administrative,
political, and social venues).
225
See Sara K. Rankin, Invidious Deliberation: The Problem of Congressional Bias in
Federal Hate Crime Legislation, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 627 (2014) (discussing suspect
classification factors of political power, organization, and representation as applied to
homeless people); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 135 (2011) (same); BLAU, supra note 25, at 94 (“The political impairment of the
homeless derives from the circumstances of homelessness itself.”). See also McCann,
Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 226 (discussing studies showing “the neediest
groups of citizens typically lack the basic resources to employ litigation strategies”).
226
Id.
222
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political process.”227 This deference creates a “dialogic default”
because certain vulnerable groups are not protected by the judiciary,
and “they also lack the types of resources typically required for effective
political mobilization to pursue protection from the political branches
of government.”228 When vulnerable groups like the homeless enter
such a dialogic default, the result is the “stagnation” of their rights.229
These challenges can impede the proposal of homeless rights in the
first place, their implementation, or their enforcement. Homeless
rights advocates across the nation are a capable and committed lot, but
they are limited in number and in financial resources. Accordingly,
the current support structure for homeless rights faces an uphill battle.
C. The Role of the Judiciary
[F]ormal legal actions to redress social wrongs are initiated almost daily, yet
only rarely do they contribute to the development of a broad-based social movement.230

The third contributor to a successful rights revolution, an activist
judiciary, also withers when specifically applied to the homeless. In the
context of homeless rights, an activist judiciary would make rightsbased decisions in keeping with ideologies that recognize and value
homeless rights. But, as explained in this section, courts are reluctant
to depart from mainstream norms and generally enforce laws in line
with the status quo as defined by society through its elected branches
of government.231 Given the general disposition of the status quo
toward homeless people, a court is unlikely to forge new ideological
ground on homeless rights.
Currently active homeless bills of rights demonstrate a strong
mainland trend to pursue judicially enforceable bills; even Puerto
Rico—a civil law jurisdiction that has so far centered its homeless rights
legislation on an administrative model—appears to be considering
227

See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law,
Dual Rules of Law & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 631 (2008).
228
Id.
229
Id. at 636.
230
McCann, Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 238.
231
See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 211, at 13–15 (discussing such external pressures
on the judiciary that limit its ability to affect social reform); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 500
(2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2067 (2002). See also
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1225 (2001)
(noting that the Civil Rights Acts “announced great antidiscrimination principles but
were narrowly construed by a post-Reconstruction judiciary afraid to disturb the
political consensus in favor of racial segregation”).
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judicial redress provisions.232 This predisposition stems from the view
that court-centered enforcement is necessary to save a law from being
merely aspirational. The presumption of judicial remedies is also
fueled by legal scholarship, which tends to equate the existence of a
right with its enforcement.233 Indeed, rights revolution scholarship is
predisposed to see judicial enforcement as the ultimate hallmark of a
right. In the rights revolution, the judiciary ultimately enforced—and
thus, made real—civil rights and liberties.234
Certainly, the judiciary can play a significant role in social change.
Judicial pronouncements can benefit social movements by bestowing
a sense of legitimacy to rights claims, mobilizing constituents,
providing publicity, and increasing a rights claimant’s bargaining
power.235 Even the threat of litigation can provide helpful leverage.236
Moreover, litigation need not be successful in order to advance social
movements; even unsuccessful litigation can support reform.237
But the promise of judicially enforceable rights may prove
elusive.238 First, many of the rights treasured by homeless advocates are
rendered practically unenforceable due to real and perceived political
and economic limitations.239 For example, in discussing Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s historic proposed entitlement to “a useful and
remunerative job,” Cass Sunstein observed:

232

The vast majority of advocates interviewed for this Article stressed the vital
importance of judicial enforcement. See, e.g., Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64 (“Do
you want ‘feel good’ legislation, or do you want it to be enforceable?”); Interview with
Eisinger, supra note 64 (describing judicial enforceability as “real protection” and the
lack of judicial protection as a “problem”); Interview with Pérez, supra note 84
(discussing the advantages of judicial enforceability).
233
For example, Frank Cross argues, “[t]he notion of a legal right necessarily
implies law, which implies government enforcement. The claim that legal rights
require legal enforcement is tautological . . . .” Cross, supra note 66, at 861 (discussing
the role of government action in the definition of legal rights). See also Holmes &
Sunstein, supra note 68, at 43 (explaining that all legal rights depend on government
enforcement).
234
EPP, supra note 213, at 3.
235
See, e.g., MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 144–45 (1994). See generally Douglas NeJaime,
Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2001) (arguing that even judicial defeats
can advance social reform movements).
236
MCCANN, supra note 235, at 144–45.
237
NeJaime, supra note 235, at 941.
238
See Harris, supra note 224, at 916–17 (documenting governmental retreat from
social welfare reforms and discussing barriers to implementation of rights remedies);
Southworth, supra note 214, at 1208 (discussing analyses of the various factors, beyond
judicial enforcement, that determine whether rights are recognized).
239
Cross, supra note 66, at 880–93.

RANKIN (DO NOT DELETE)

422

4/12/2015 9:28 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:383

With respect to judicial enforcement, the difficulty [with a
right to work] does not lie in ambiguity or vagueness, but in
the limited resources of government and the extreme
difficulty of ensuring the rights . . . are respected in
practice . . . . No nation can ensure that every citizen has a
job; a certain level of unemployment is inevitable.240
The potential budgetary toll of any social welfare rights legislation
is a pragmatic constraint, both on judicial enforcement and on
administrative implementation.241Moreover, the justiciability of
positive rights is a political constraint.242 Although statutory rights are
distinct from constitutional rights, if positive rights become part of
homeless bills of rights and these rights are later challenged, courts are
more likely to push for enforcement if these rights “seem to conform
to majoritarian sentiment” and do not “impose substantial costs on the
budget of the government at any level.”243 To the extent homeless
advocates succeed in securing the inclusion of new social welfare
remedies in homeless bills of rights, as an economic and political
matter, the judiciary may review even statutory violations with a degree
of caution and deference, ultimately allowing legislatures to determine
the destiny of such laws.244
This prediction is supported by state court trends with respect to
statutory rights to housing. Following the Supreme Court’s lead,245
state courts generally refuse to recognize a right to housing in state

240

CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND
WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 210 (2009).
241
See generally Cross, supra note 66 (discussing pragmatic, economic limitations on
judicial enforcement); see also Harris, supra note 224, at 922–23, 926–27 (discussing
case studies about the budgetary influences on agency implementation).
242
The justiciability of social welfare rights is hotly debated. Some scholars
contend that judicial intervention in matters of economic and social policy is a breach
of the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 66, at 887–93
(discussing various political critiques). Others argue that courts frequently (and
properly) decide issues that affect budgetary and economic policy. See Nice, supra note
227, at 629. See generally Harris, supra note 224.
243
Cross, supra note 66, at 873–74.
244
Although my prediction relates to the judiciary’s review of statutory rights, it
resonates with Mark Tushnet’s constitutional law prescription for “weak judicial
remedies.” Tushnet, supra note 67, at 1910–11. Through this model, courts identify
the violation of a right but then provide only light oversight of a remedial plan’s
implementation. Id. at 1910. In light of potential constraints on judicial enforcement,
advocates can strengthen their position by advocating for a role in implementation.
See Harris supra note 224, at 911–17; discussion infra notes 263–268 and accompanying
text.
245
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (explaining that despite the
importance of safe, sanitary housing, “the Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill.”).
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constitutions.246 But even when state courts recognize a statutory duty
to provide housing, judicial enforcement efforts frequently prompt
state legislatures to repeal or modify the law at issue.247 The bottom
line is, “courts generally lack the independence and resources to
enforce their decisions against recalcitrant groups in government and
society.”248 As a result, the enactment of positive social welfare rights
can be empty, symbolic legislative gestures that dissipate—even when
tested in court.249
Moreover, a pre-occupation with judicial enforceability obscures
the critical role of administrative agencies in the implementation of
rights.
Beth Harris’s work persuasively argues that lawyers
representing homeless families must conceive of advocacy “beyond the
courtroom into the implementation process.”250 Homeless advocates
must assume this role because neither rights litigation nor rights
246

Most state courts refuse to recognize a constitutional duty for states to provide
shelter; New York is a well-recognized exception. See Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979) (recognizing a right to emergency shelter based on state
constitutional guarantee of aid, care, and support for the needy).
247
A few state courts have attempted to enforce explicit, mandatory statutory
obligations to provide shelter to the homeless. See, e.g., Baltimore v. Dist. of Columbia,
10 A.3d 1141(D.C. 2011) (construing language that the city “shall” provide sufficient
shelter in severe or frigid weather as a statutory entitlement, but concluding that
plaintiffs had not established city’s failure to provide such shelter); Ctr. Twp. of Marion
County v. Coe, 572 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (requiring the town trustee
to comply with emergency shelter provisions); Clark v. Milwaukee County, 524 N.W.2d
382, 386 (Wis. 1994) (finding a $98.00 shelter stipend insufficient for “health and
decency”); Hilton v. New Haven, No. 8904–3165, 1989 Conn. Super. LEXIS 52 (Conn.
Super. Ct., Dec. 27, 1989) (ordering the city of New Haven to provide shelter services
to anyone claiming to need them). But significantly, many states and municipalities
do not respond to such decisions by implementing the original statutory provisions;
instead, when tested, these legislatures commonly repeal or significantly narrow their
statutory obligations. See, e.g., NYC Department of Homeless Services Procedure No. 12-400,
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, available at http://coalhome.3cdn.net/3a34f202
045a8e03d4_rgm6benw9.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (modifying the Callaghan
consent decree by allowing implementation of state regulations to deny shelter due to
non-compliance with administrative rules); D.C. Code § 4-751.01 (proposing to limit
the Baltimore holding by requiring individuals seeking shelter to prove district
residency via valid identification); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-2-1-6 (avoiding the Marion
County holding by repealing specific code provision); 1995 Wisconsin Act 18, WISCONSIN
STATE LEGISLATURE,
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1995/related/acts/18 (last
visited Feb. 18, 2015) (avoiding the Clark finding by amending county law to remove
the burden placed upon the government. See also Chapter 319s* Financial Assistance,
CONNECTICUT STATE LEGISLATURE, §§ 17b-120 and 121, http://www.cga.ct.gov/
current/pub/chap_319s.htm#secs_17b-120_to_17b-121 (last visited Feb. 18, 2015)
(nullifying the Hilton holding by repealing state law requiring provision of emergency
shelter by municipalities).
248
McCann, Law and Social Movements, supra note 210, at 32.
249
Id. at 33.
250
Harris, supra note 224, at 911 (citing Galanter, supra note 224, at 154).
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legislation alone can ensure agency implementation of rights.251
Barriers to implementation frequently include budgetary constraints,
waning political commitment, and administrative resource constraints;
however, implementation can also be thwarted by agencies’ general
resistance to change.252 So homeless advocates, Harris contends, must
carve out means to influence the implementation process.253 “Court
orders and judicially constructed remedies can provide lawyers points
of access to implementation decisions” through specific provisions for
ongoing court supervision, the designation of independent monitors,
and the incorporation of advocates within the agency decision-making
and implementation process.254 By “penetrating” the implementation
process, advocates can help to overcome barriers to implementation
by influencing agency policies and practices.255 Rights implementation
is most likely to occur when advocates persuade agencies that changes
in their administrative practices are in the agencies’ best interest.256
Such interest convergence occurs when advocates “transform their
substantive legal frames and agendas into organizational
infrastructures that enhance, rather than threat, the reputations of the
targeted organizations.”257
Therefore, homeless bills of rights are more likely to be realized
when advocates secure a role in the implementation process.258
Because administrative agencies, including law enforcement, play such
a significant role in the rights experience of homeless Americans, the
relevance of implementation becomes even more pronounced. So far,
mainland bills appear to concentrate on judicial enforcement, but
251

Id. at 911–16 (reviewing related sociolegal scholarship).
See generally, id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 915.
256
Harris, supra note 224, at 916.
257
Id. Harris’s point invokes Derek Bell’s interest convergence theory, which
essentially contends that civil rights progress (especially affirmative action) only occurs
when it benefits white elites. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003); DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 149 (2004) (referring to
Grutter as a “prime example” of the interest-convergence thesis). See also Harvey, supra
note 1, at 721 (“Particular claims do not take hold in a society and become
institutionalized unless they serve the interests and attract the enduring support of
strategically powerful interest groups.”).
258
Harris, supra note 224, at 933. Harris’s work suggests other factors can impact
whether a rights claim is successfully realized through the implementation process,
including whether the court assumes an ongoing oversight role, whether
organizational outcomes are monitored, and whether methods of accountability are
enforced. Id.
252
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have not yet incorporated administrative implementation provisions.
Puerto Rico’s legislation is impressive for its attention to administrative
implementation. For example, the laws establish a multi-sector
Commission, the Commission’s membership must include at least two
homeless residents, and the Commission’s duties involve the
development of substantive policies, implementation plans, and forms
of assessment.259 Puerto Rico’s legislation, however, is hampered by a
structural conflict of interest because the same agency develops,
implements, and enforces the law.260 But if Puerto Rico incorporates
judicial enforcement provisions and corrects the structural conflicts of
interest, those modifications could have significant results. Ideally,
advocates would also consider the specific structural and strategic
advice from Beth Harris’s careful analysis of the implementation of
homeless rights laws.261
But interest in homeless bills of rights should also appreciate that
the realization of homeless rights even exceeds judicial enforcement
and agency implementation. Some argue that there is no such thing
as an unenforced right; such “rights” amount only to “toothless” moral
claims.262 As explained above, judicially enforceable laws certainly can
be valuable tools in rights advocacy. But there are reasons why
advocates still might want to pursue homeless bills of rights, even if the
prospects of judicial enforcement or agency implementation currently
seem depressed. As a primary matter, it is too simplistic to equate
enforcement with a right; such an absolute posture
treats enforceability as though it were a switch with only two
positions—on or off. Reality is far more complicated . . .
[because] the practical enforceability of rules depends on a
range of other factors such as how much money a potential
plaintiff has to spend on legal fees, the current state of public
opinion, and even the identity of the judge to whom a case is
assigned . . . . To define legal rights as synonymous with legal
outcomes, or even “expected” legal outcomes, fails
adequately to account for the grey areas and uncertainties
that define the ground between what the law promises (or
259

See discussion supra notes 117–123 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 117–123 and accompanying text.
261
See generally Harris, supra note 224.
262
See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 17 (calling unenforced moral rights
“toothless by definition”). Many advocates interviewed for this Article agreed with this
characterization of unenforceable rights. See, e.g., Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64
(contrasting “feel good” laws with “enforceable” ones); Interview with Arms, supra note
65 (explaining that “watered down” bills are inadequate because they do not have any
“teeth” and are “basically feel good measures”); Interview with Eisinger, supra note 64
(stressing the need for laws to be more than “just for show”).
260

RANKIN (DO NOT DELETE)

426

4/12/2015 9:28 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:383

seems to promise) and what it delivers in fact.263
Even under projections where homeless bills of rights are not
likely to be immediately enforced or implemented, this new legislative
tool can still serve a valuable role in publicizing and catalyzing
homeless rights claims. Marc Galanter famously suggested that the law
should be understood “as a system of cultural and symbolic meanings
[rather] than as a set of operative controls.”264 In other words,
homeless bills of rights, as a statutory legal medium, may indirectly
support homeless rights advocacy through “centrifugal” and
“radiating” effects on the social movement building process.265 These
effects include “catalyzing movement building efforts, generating
public support for new rights claims, or providing pressure to
supplement other political tactics.”266 This perspective liberates rights
from the confines of the judiciary, recognizing that rights are “claimed
and negotiated in a wide variety of settings, including courts but also
legislatures, agencies, the workplace, the media, public squares and
private interactions, and how these various forms of activism influence
one another in complex ways.”267
In summary, judicial enforcement is not the only relevant venue
for realizing rights; other government agencies and social settings
negotiate rights and contribute to their definition.268 This broader
perspective of rights discourse helps to explain why social movements
must anticipate the relationship between the law and rights
consciousness.

263

Harvey, supra note 1, at 712–13.
Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects on Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT
COURTS 117, 127 (Keith Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983).
265
Id.
266
McCann, Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 230 (discussing Galanter’s
theory).
267
Southworth, supra note 214, at 1214 (citing Helena Silverstein, UNLEASHING
RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12 (1996) (discussing
McCann’s work). Advocates know well that social change is always “an inside game
and an outside game.” Interview with Ryczek, supra note 64 (explaining the need to
work not only with political insiders, but also with the media and other aspects of the
public to create a receptive environment for homeless advocacy); McCann, Legal
Mobilization, supra note 210, at 235 (discussing benefits of media coverage to social
movements).
268
Southworth, supra note 214, at 1208 (“Courts . . . are not the only arenas in
which activists invoke rights claims and attempt to give them legal force, and they are
not the only institutions to have contributed to the expansion of individual rights.”).
264
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D. Homeless Rights Consciousness
The fourth “necessary condition” for a rights revolution is a
culture of rights consciousness. Generally speaking, American culture
is a “rights conscious” culture, but private and institutionalized biases
against the poor (and the homeless in particular) make this
consciousness contextual. In other words, this rights consciousness is
more generous on a general and abstract level, and less so when
applied directly to individuals that are largely rejected by society, such
as the homeless. A wealth of research showing negative societal
attitudes toward the homeless269 and the prevalence of discriminatory
laws targeting the homeless270 support this proposition. Indeed, social
movement scholars seem to recognize that the poor and homeless are
generally less successful in legal mobilization, “largely owing to the
absence of favorable social conditions.”271 Put more bluntly, prevalent,
negative societal attitudes toward the homeless limit the potential of
movement mobilization. These limitations persist not only in the
biases of housed individuals, but also in the learned disengagement of
homeless people themselves.272 Legal mobilization research suggests
269

See discussion supra Part I.A.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
271
See, e.g., McCann, Law and Social Movements, supra note 210, at 34 (“[W]elfare
rights and the rights of the homeless—have found very little at all to cheer about in
the records of legal action.”).
272
See generally Michael McCann, Expanding the Horizons of Horizontal Inquiry into
Rights Consciousness: An Engagement with David Engel, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 467,
471–72 (2012) (discussing how “marginal groups, especially the poor” may be
unengaged in rights advocacy in part because they “internalize blame and endure
when they suffer injury”). Joel Blau further explains how the experience of
homelessness can undermine legal and political rights engagement:
Political activity requires a certain minimal self-confidence, a belief in
one’s power to bring about change. Yet loss of this faith is one of the
first psychological effects of homelessness. Stigmatized and facing
constant rejection, many homeless people gradually come to accept the
world’s own view of them, and this self-image gradually destroys their
feelings of political efficacy. The message is a simple one: someone
without a home is an inconsequential person, and the actions of an
inconsequential person cannot have political consequences.
BLAU, supra note 25, at 94. Moreover, research suggests that legal mobilization is least
likely to succeed “among persons unattached to relatively stable associational
networks, caught in ‘dead end’ life situations where opportunity structures vary little,
and lacking material resource support for defiant action.” McCann, Legal Mobilization,
supra note 210, at 240. These trends “help explain why legal advocacy for
[marginalized groups like the homeless] offers little hope of empowerment, and may
even add to their victimization.” Id. at 240–41. Nonetheless, McCann and others
conclude that legal mobilization can be particularly helpful in early stages of a social
movement, through agenda-setting, building constituencies, and generating new
rights claims and consciousness. Id. at 276 (reviewing various “pessimistic” legal
mobilization theories and urging a “more subtle, complex, and balanced perspective”
270
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that “the capacity and inclination of people to envision law as an
appropriate resource for pursuing their interests varies based upon
social location,” including class and wealth.273 Given that the status quo
is generally antagonistic—or at best, apathetic—to homeless rights and
given that homeless people face extraordinary obstacles to collective
mobilization, the outlook for a homeless rights revolution may appear
pessimistic. But, as explained below, homeless bills of rights might
help.
V. THE ROLE OF HOMELESS BILLS OF RIGHTS
The most frequently expressed criticism of economic and social human rights
is that they are mere aspirations to which governments may pay lip-service but have
no duty to secure in practice. What these critics fail to note is that this is true of
virtually all human rights claims when they are first accorded formal
recognition . . . . Indeed, the aspirational recognition of unenforced rights may be
a necessary stage in their historical development.274

Even if the requisite conditions for a homeless social movement
do not yet exist, homeless bills of rights can help to make conditions
more conducive to change. Given the pervasive discrimination and
hostility homeless people continue to face, homeless bills of rights are
arguably emerging in the nascent stages of a potential rights
revolution. Thus, homeless bills of rights might be a significant initial
step in forming a new rights consciousness; even if they face challenges
in enforcement and implementation, these emerging laws can
transform the “discursive possibility and relational power . . . to some
degree.”275 After all, “[p]erhaps the most significant point at which law
matters for many social movements is during the earliest phases of
organizational and agenda formation.”276 Developing laws can serve as
a catalyst to raise consciousness about the rights of marginalized
groups, like the homeless, by setting an agenda in “which movement
on the potential usefulness of legal rights advocacy to social movements). Indeed, the
codification of homeless rights may be one of the few forms of “bargaining leverage”
available to homeless people. See, e.g., id. at 246. Finally, Marc Galanter and Beth
Harris’s work clearly establishes the ability of poverty lawyers to use such leverage from
judicial decisions through the implementation process, ultimately shaping norms,
policies, and actions within administrative agencies. Harris, supra note 224, at 912–16
(discussing Galanter’s work and the role of lawyers in the implementation of
redistributive reforms that benefit homeless people).
273
Jeffrey R. Dudas, Book Review of Law and Social Movements: Contemporary
Perspectives, 2 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 17 (2006) (book review).
274
Harvey, supra note 1, 717–18.
275
McCann, Law and Social Movements, supra note 210, at 34.
276
Id. at 25.
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actors draw on legal discourses to name and to challenge existing
social wrongs or injustices.”277 Laws that clearly announce civil,
constitutional, and human rights—like the homeless bills of rights—
facilitate new discursive, epistemological, and normative grounding
for social movements.278
Rather than expressing the rules we currently are willing to
live by, human rights norms tend always to exceed our reach.
They are a kind of law by which human societies set goals for
themselves. By asserting that everyone has these rights, even
when we are not prepared to honor them in practice, we
challenge ourselves to live up to our own aspirations . . . .
That may not sound like true law, but given the power of
human rights claims to drive the historical process, it would
be foolish to dismiss human rights proclamations as toothless
or lacking in legitimacy simply because the struggle to
enforce them has yet to be won.279
Instead, homeless bills of rights can be understood as playing a
potentially significant role in the evolution of a homeless rights
revolution. Certainly, so far, the newly enacted laws generally affirm
that homeless citizens should be entitled to the same rights as those
afforded to the housed, such as rights to freedom from discrimination
or rights to privacy and property. Some of these rights claims (at least
when applied to homeless people) may not seem generally accepted,
enforceable, or even likely to be implemented. But, as with many
fundamental rights, “bits and pieces” can be gradually secured over
time.280 As homeless rights claims are incrementally secured, the rights
agenda can grow and expand.281 Rights advocates understand their
work is never truly done; the hallmark of such fundamental rights
claims is that they “remain a work in progress rather than a finished
project.”282 The evolutionary process of agenda building around rights
277

Id.; see also Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 76 (2001) (“A statute . . . may provide an
opportunity for identity formation by a group of potential participants.”).
278
McCann, Law and Social Movements, supra note 210, at 25–29; see also Dudas, supra
note 273, at 1 (citing MCCANN, supra note 235; STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS
OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL CHANGE (U. Mich. Press, 2d. ed.
2004); Jeffrey R. Dudas, In the Name of Equal Rights: ‘Special’ Rights and the Politics of
Resentment in Post-Civil Rights America, 39 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 723 (2005)).
279
Harvey, supra note 1, at 718–19.
280
Id. at 722.
281
Id. (“The second thing that happens when rights are partially secured is
that . . . . People reconceive the practical policy goals embodied in the right, raising
their sights in a way that always leaves the right beyond their grasp. In other words,
the right remains aspirational.”).
282
Id. at 723. Harvey also describes the efforts of rights advocates as “hav[ing]
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claims is particularly pronounced where, as here, the basic rights
denied to a marginalized group of people are otherwise considered
basic, fundamental human rights.
At their core, homeless bills of rights can help to educate, raise
awareness, and increase understanding about the unfair
discrimination and hostility homeless people commonly experience.283
Housed society is generally familiar with and accepting of rights
discourse, including statutory rights. The codification of rights for
homeless people, then, is a particularly visible venue for impacting
rights consciousness. The enactment of homeless bills of rights
might—and hopefully will—strike housed Americans as odd,
prompting questions like: Aren’t these rights the same rights
“everyone” enjoys? Why do homeless people need a separate
affirmation of these fundamental rights? Such dissonance creates a
unique opportunity to change public perceptions and attitudes about
homelessness.
Moreover, the codification of fundamental rights might not just
educate the housed public, but it could help to empower advocates
and homeless citizens. As advocates help to inform homeless people
about their options for asserting claims pursuant to these new laws,
homeless citizens might sense legitimate entitlement to better, fairer
conditions. “[W]hen citizens begin to assert their rights that imply
demands for change, there develops a new sense of efficacy; people
who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe they have
some capacity to alter their lot.”284
The current deficit of homeless rights consciousness can be a
major motivation behind homeless bills of rights. At a minimum,
homeless bills of rights will provoke conversation and increase
opportunities for housed individuals to consider and discuss homeless
rights. The potential shift in discursive possibility can impact housed
society and its proxies in the legislature, law enforcement, and other
administrative agencies.
Accordingly, in instances where the
legislature opens the door to specific expressions of homeless rights—
even slightly, as it has done in some jurisdictions with homeless bills of
many way stations but no real terminus.” Id. at 724. See also McCann, Legal Mobilization,
supra note 210, at 238 (describing analogous pay equity claims advocates as viewing
these claims as “one historical step in the long-term struggle for progressive wealth
redistribution in modern society.”).
283
McCann, Legal Mobilization, supra note 210, at 234 (“At the most minimal level,
legal rights advocacy holds the potential for simply expanding citizen awareness and
understanding about social relations; in short, in can help to educate citizens about
the systematic sources and character of unjust victimization.”).
284
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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rights—such legislation presents an opportunity to transform basic
rights consciousness. Perhaps these homeless bills of rights will have
their most enduring impact on the American culture of rights
discourse.
VI. CONCLUSION
The naming of homeless rights in legal practice is, of course,
constrained by societal attitudes toward these rights.285 The trend so
far suggests that advocates’ top priorities are not likely to be
incorporated into a homeless bill of rights—at least on the mainland.
As demonstrated above, efforts to improve the lives of homeless
Americans commonly value positive rights, such as affordable housing
and healthcare, as well as negative rights, such as the abrogation of
homeless criminalization laws. Although the mainland effort is in its
very early stages, none of the currently enacted mainland bills—Rhode
Island, Illinois, or Connecticut—specifically incorporate these top
priorities.286 California’s proposed bill tried to test these boundaries;
although the bill made significant progress, it ultimately failed. At least
for now, the newly enacted laws generally affirm that homeless citizens
should be entitled to the same rights as those afforded to the housed,
such as rights to freedom from discrimination or rights to privacy and
property. Although the Puerto Rico legislation has a much more
expansive substantive reach, the island’s experience suggests that even
if these rights are enacted, they may not be successfully implemented.
This leaves some advocates wondering whether homeless bills of rights
are worth the investment.
But one reason these laws are likely to be limited as proposed,
enforced, or implemented actually demonstrates why these laws are
necessary: housed society generally perceives homeless people as nonhuman. Putting aside common economic objections to positive
rights,287 the general mainland resistance to anti-criminalization
measures reflects popular attitudes among housed Americans: we do
not like to be confronted with visible poverty.288 We also prefer to
blame homeless people for their own condition, which expunges any

285

Id. at 230 (explaining that legal practice both constraints and expands
possibilities in rights discourse).
286
Of course, advocates have secured some targeted successes with respect to these
priorities, but so far these successes are not related to codification in homeless bills of
rights.
287
See generally Cross, supra note 66, at 880–87; discussion supra notes 72–76.
288
2011 NLCHP Report, supra note 31. See generally 2014 NLCHP Report, supra
note 31.
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sense of obligation to support or protect homeless rights.289 So perhaps
the greatest obstacle to homeless rights stems from a lack of legal rights
consciousness about homeless people and the extraordinary
persecution and discrimination these men, women, and children
endure as a result.
Homeless bills of rights present an important opportunity to
impact American rights consciousness. The emergence of these new
laws may encourage housed Americans to confront—and perhaps one
day, overcome—our persistent, deeply-rooted biases against the
homeless. Regardless of whether homeless advocates’ ideal provisions
are enacted, enforced, or implemented in the near future, even
modest versions of these new laws can stake an important claim in the
movement building process. After all, the U.S. Declaration of
Independence and the Bill of Rights remained dormant and
aspirational for years after their enactment, but like all declarations of
fundamental rights, these documents set crucial goals for society to
achieve over time.290
Such is the slippery and complex nature of rights. Perhaps no
other topic generates the same richness of debate: what are rights;
when do rights exist; how do rights (and should they) influence or
control the behavior of government and individuals? Ultimately, it is
through this rabbit hole that homeless bills of rights must travel. To
be sure, it is not a simple journey, but the quest will be worthwhile if
these new laws can make a meaningful difference in the rights of
homeless people, and how housed Americans value and recognize
them.

289
290

See discussion supra, at Part I.B.
Harvey, supra note 1, at 717–18.
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Table 1: Cross-Jurisdictional Comparisons of Provisions
The chart below compares common provisions among current
mainland drafts of homeless bills of rights. Puerto Rico’s legislation is
excluded from this chart due to its unique provisions.
Key
P1………………Included in proposed legislation
P2………………Included in substitute legislation
(only applicable to RI, HI, IL, CT, and CA)
L………………..Included in engrossed legislation
(only applicable to RI, HI, IL, CT, and CA)
X……………….Not included
Com…………In Committee
RI

HI

1/11/12

1/23/13 1/30/13

IL

CT

OR

VT

MO

MS

CA

2/15/13

2/21/13

3/12/13

3/13/13

5/13/13

12/3/12

SB 2502

HB
SB 1210 SSB 896
1205
(P1),
1889
(P2),
2661
(L)
Both in Signed
Signed into
com.
into law law

HB 3122

HB 493

SB 428

H.3595

AB 5

Com.

Com.

Com.

Com.

Suspended

P1, P2
P1, P2, L
removed, altered
L
replaced

P1

P1

P1

P1

P1, P2

P1, P2, L
P1, P2, L
(amended
Equal treatment
terms
used)
P1, P2
Seek, maintain added
employment
maintain,
L
Emergency
P1, P2, L
medical care
P1, P2, L
Vote

P2, L
P1, P2, L P1, P2, L
P1, P2, P1, P2, L P1, P2, L
L

P1
P1

P1
P1

P1
P1

P1
P1

P1, P2, L
P1, P2 specifies
law enforcement, L

P1, P2, L

P1

P1

P1

P1

P1, P2

P1, P2, L

P1

P1

P1

P1

P1, P2

P1, P2, L

P1

P1

P1

P1

P1, P2

Information
disclosure
protection
Personal
P1, P2, L
property
privacy
Attorney’s fees P2, L
X

P1, P2, L

P1

P1

P1

P1

P1, P2, L
removes

P1, P2, P1, P2, L P1, P2, L
L

P1

P1

P1

P1

P1, P2

P1
P2

X
X

X
X

P1
X

X
X

P1, P2
X

Date introduced

Bill number

Status

Signed
into law

Right to. . .
Housing status/ P1, P2, L P2, L
homeless
person
definition
Move freely

P1, P2, P1, P2
L
removed
“seek”, L
enrolls
P1, P2, P1, P2, L
L
P1, P2, P1, P2, L
L
P1, P2, L P1, P2, P1, P2, L
L

Public notice

P1, P2, L X
X
P1, P2, L
changed
“shall” post
notice to
“may”
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X

P1

P1, P2, L X

P1

P1

P1

X

P1, P2

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2, L
removes
P1, P2 removes

P1, P2
removes
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2 removes

X

X

X

X

P1

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2, L
removes
P1, P2 removes

Forbids refusal X
to rent or sell
property
X
Share/give food

X

X

X

X

X

P1

X

P1, P2, L

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Clean
restrooms
Income for
survival
Restitution for
loss of property
Free from
arbitrary arrest

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2, L
removes
P1, P2 removes

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2 removes

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2 removes

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P2, P3 removes

Affordable
housing

P1, P2
removes

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2 removes

Clean
temporary
housing
Refuse service
in shelter
Occupy
vehicles

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2 removes

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2

P2 adds

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Conduct life
sustaining
activities in
public
Practice
religion in
public
Be selfemployed
Medical
facilities
Hygienic
facilities
Hygienic
provisions

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2 adds
sleep, L
removes sleep
P1, P2 removes

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P2

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2 removes

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2 removes

Clean water

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P1, P2 removes

Counsel
Enrollment of
kids in school
School supplies

Rest in public

